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Political Communication Systems and Voter Participation

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Political Communication Systems and Voter Participation

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Political Communication Systems and Voter Participation

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This dissertation explores how institutional settings regulating the media and campaigns affect voter participation. The broader question is what types of political communication systems are likely to produce the most engaged and participatory citizens as well as equal participation. Assuming that political participation is affected by its underlying costs and benefits, I hypothesize that political communication systems that lower information costs for voters have higher turnout levels and reduce upper class bias. Political communication systems are measured by media systems, access to paid TV advertising, and campaign finance laws. In the country-level turnout models, investigating seventy-four electoral democracies, I find that public broadcasting systems increase voter turnout, while changing the effect of paid advertising. Public broadcasting systems that allow paid TV advertising have a higher turnout levels than those ban paid advertising. Conversely, paid advertising in private broadcasting systems have a negative marginal effect on voter turnout. On the other hand, campaign finance laws that allow more money to enter election campaigns increase voter participation. So campaign contribution and spending limits depress turnout and public finance increases it. The hierarchical models in Chapter 6 show that political communication systems also change the relationship between individual socioeconomic status and voter participation. Generally political communication environment that lower information costs for voters reduces

socioeconomic bias for voters. Public broadcasting systems, access to paid TV ads, and free TV time, thus, mitigate the effect of education on voting. Additional investigation also shows that the age gap between voters and nonvoters is conditioned by different types of political communication systems. Both partisan press and public direct funding promote younger citizens' participation, thus decreasing the generation gap. In contrast, campaign contribution/expenditure limits enlarge such gap. Broadcasting systems also affect the effect of age on voting. Because older people spend more time on watching television than younger ones, the type of broadcasting system has a disproportionately larger impact on older citizens.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

How do political communication systems—a set of institutions governing the transactions of political messages between political elites and masses—affect voter participation? Ideal democratic citizens are expected to have an interest in public affairs, possess the ability to relate their opinions on issues to their vote, and properly exercise their political rights and responsibilities. For citizens to be attentive, informed, and active participants in politics, they need an environment that provides them with adequate political information. Many have noted the vital role of political communication for the health and maintenance of democracy (Jefferson 1786; Curran and Gurevich 1996). Political communications produce messages that stimulate political behavior and images that determine the dynamics and quality of politics.[1] In particular, electioneering communications are important because they influence "the conduct, responsiveness, and effectiveness of government" as well as the public's attitudes toward the government (Mancini and Swanson 1996, 2). Lasswell (1948) argues that in democratic society, rational public opinion relies on enlightenment, which in turn depends on efficient communication. Graber (1993) also notes that "[m]ajor political processes such as political socialization, political participation and free circulation of information throughout the country all hinged on the nature and quality of the country's political communication system. If information flowed properly and generated adequate feedback, the political system could be steered toward growth and development" (314).

Apparently acknowledging such significant roles of political communications for democratic governance, governments regulate political communication. As societies have become more complex, governments regulate more aspects in media markets and

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[1] Thomas Jefferson considered the media to be essential in maintaining democracy. Many other scholars also acknowledge the importance of political communication in various terms, such as "the nerves of Government," and "the connective tissue of democracy," and "guarantors of elite accountability and popular control of government in democracies" (Mughan and Gunther 2000, 4).

political campaigns, while the configurations of such regulations vary widely across countries. For example, countries have developed diverse structures of broadcasting markets, press systems, and campaign finance regimes (Alexander 1989; Alexander and Shiratori; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Norris 2002; Semetko 1996; Plasser and Plasser 2002; Swanson and Mancini 1996; Butler and Ranney 1992). I argue that institutional settings surrounding the media and election campaigns, such as media systems, paid television advertising, and campaign finance laws, influence political actors' attitudes and behavior. Such structures change the nature and availability of political information and campaign resources available to political parties or/and candidates. The main purpose of this study is to examine the effects of political communication systems on voter participation, which constitutes the most common form of political participation in democracies. On a higher level, I hope to determine what kind of communication system best promotes an engaged citizenry in a representative democracy. Specifically, my research focuses on three questions: (1) How do electoral democracies structure media systems and campaign communication in the early 2000s? (2) What are the effects on voter turnout of different political communication systems, such as media systems, paid television advertising, and campaign finance regulations? (3) How do political communication systems affect the participation of voters with different socioeconomic status? In other words, do certain aspects of communication institutions promote (or hinder) equal participation?

Extant studies have suggested that political information is an important factor in shaping individual political attitudes and behavior. The rational choice approach suggests that individuals are information misers who want to minimize the costs of becoming informed. Therefore, an information environment that can lower information costs would promote political participation (Downs 1957). In a similar vein, the mobilization theory of political participation suggests that an essential role of social association and campaigns is cutting the cost of voting by providing both necessary information as well as motivation. In sum, an information-rich environment theoretically increases citizens' political participation by decreasing the information cost for them. These theories

generally emphasize the availability or volume of political information for an individual's decision to participate in politics (Bimber 2001).

On the other hand, system-level analysts have found that the roles of the government and the market are each essential in understanding the structure of political communication systems. The mass media are powerful tools by which the government can sway public opinion and sentiment; thus, the government tries to control and manipulate them. The extent to which governments involve themselves in the political communication process varies from country to country and thus affects the character of political information systems. Regarding the proper role of government in structuring these units, the liberal model of the mass media asserts that government intervention distorts information and that the market ensures the free exchange of political information. Conversely, the public model argues that political information is basically a public good; thus, it should not be left to private interests. These system-level theories of the media concern both the quantity and quality of political information transferred to citizens. How governmental and commercial influence in the media affects citizen participation in politics, however, has not yet been defined empirically.

What do we know about the relationship between different political information systems and levels of voter participation in democratic societies? What kinds of communication systems are most conducive to a democratic citizenry? In detailing these questions, political communication studies are marked by a rather clumsy dialogue (or lack thereof) between behaviorists and institutionalists (Mughan and Gunther 2000). Behaviorists (and some rational choice theorists) focus mainly on media effects on individual cognition and decision making, and have therefore not paid significant attention to political communication institutions or the structure of media markets. As a result, such work overpredict turnout of countries that are politically and economically developed, but institute communication regulations deterring voter participation. On the other hand, system-level analysts have not made enough effort to link the institutional setting to political outputs or citizens' political behavior. And thus, their works remain silent about the causal relationships between political communication systems and voter

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participation. For a more systematic approach to the relationship between political communication systems and citizen political behavior, we need an amalgamation of the behaviorist and institutionalist perspectives. To date, surprisingly few investigations explore the relationship between political communication systems and citizen attitudes and behavior. Scholars have noted the lack (and the necessity) of cross-national comparative studies to specify the institutional effects of political communication systems on political outcomes and mass behavior. Mughan and Gunther (2000, 1) point out that "the literature in political science is notable for the general absence of rigorous comparative analyses of the mutually influencing interaction between the flow of political information, on the one hand, and the basic democratic character of political regimes and individual political attitudes and behavior, on the other." Similarly, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 8) call attention to dearth of comparative political communication research;"[i]t is worth noting that, just as communication scholars have paid little attention to comparative analysis, scholars of comparative politics have paid little attention to the media." Considering the complexities and difficulties that may occur in collecting and measuring data and variables of media systems, the lack of commensurate empirical analyses (especially large-*n* studies) might not be that surprising (Bartels 1993; Graber 2002).[2] However, the past decade has seen an increase of scholarly interest in cross-national differences in the patterns of campaign communication, along with a substantial compilation of international data on media and campaign regulations (e.g., Plasser and Plasser 2002, Pinto-Duschinsky 2002, Butler and Ranney 1992, Norris 2002, Bowler and Farrell 2000). Thanks to such advances, a more systematic approach is now possible. In particular, the investigation of institutions, in my view, will enable a systematic comparative study because institutions are relatively objective, comparable, and manageable entities. My chief interest lies in the effects of media systems, paid television advertising, and campaign finance laws on cross-national differences in voter turnout and on socioeconomic biases in voter participation.

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[2] Graber (2002) also notes that the establishment of effects at the societal level would be even more difficult than at the individual-level.

Focusing on the informational role of the media during election campaigns, I assume that individuals are rational and respond to the incentive structures around them. If the costs of obtaining political information are sufficiently low, they are likely to become informed. Similarly, if the benefits of being engaged are manifest, they are likely to follow political campaigns and, in the end, vote. I also assume that the state can influence this decision calculus significantly. I am agnostic, however, about whether state involvement, per se, helps or hurts turnout. What matters should be the type of the government's regulations, not the mere fact of governmental interference; effects depend on whether specific government policies increase or decrease information costs and benefits for voters. My hypothesis is that political communication systems that lower information costs for voters will increase the level of voter participation and decrease unequal participation.

This dissertation aims to contribute to the study of comparative political behavior and political communication in the following ways. First, the research focuses on the effects of political communication institutions on turnout, which have not been adequately addressed in the existing literature. Second, this is the first large-*N* cross-national analysis offering a generalizable empirical theory to improve our understanding of political communication institutions in the mass media and their consequences on turnout for electoral democracies. Third, this investigation is based on an original dataset collected by the author on a wide array of political communication system variables including media systems, access to paid advertising, and campaign finance laws. Finally, this project provides policy recommendations by evaluating the performance of different communication systems with respect to promoting the most engaged citizenry.

DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The dependent variable is the average turnout rates in legislative elections between 1995 and 2004 in 74 electoral democracies. The main independent variables are political communication systems including media systems, paid television advertising,

and campaign finance laws, which are comprised largely of original data collected by the author. I selected the countries in the analysis based on two criteria. First, each country needs to be an electoral democracy that guarantees free party competition. Second, a minimum level of media penetration is required. Each country should have developed a certain level of infrastructure for broadcasting outlets, and thus a substantial number of television viewers, to estimate the valid effects of broadcasting market structure and paid TV advertising. The empirical tests – presented in Chapters 5 and 6 – rely on large-*N* statistical analyses depending on models. In Chapter 5, the unit of analysis is individual countries. I investigate how political communication systems affect cross-national differences in voter turnout using robust regression. Relying on hierarchical modeling, Chapter 6 utilizes cross-national survey data (the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 2*) to unravel the cross-level interactions between the individual-level characteristics (education, income, age, and gender) and country-level variables such as political institutions, socioeconomic development, and political communication systems.

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I place the dissertation within the broader context of scholarship about the role of political communication in democratic societies. Drawing on existing literature concerning political behavior, rational choice theory, and media system studies, I integrate different concepts to build a theory explaining how the political information environment affects citizen participation in politics. Controversies simmer regarding media effects on electorates and the best design of a communication system for good democratic governance.

In Chapter 3, I examine voter participation causality. First, I review the previous scholarly literature about the determinants of political participation. I find that socioeconomic, psychological, and political institutional factors explain individual and cross-national differences in voter participation. Then, I consider the literature about the effects of money in campaigns, of political television advertising, and of media systems

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on citizens' attitudes and behavior. Finally, I offer my hypotheses about the relationships among different aspects of political communication institutions and voter turnout.

In modern societies, political communication takes place under various legal and institutional conditions. In Chapter 4, I provide a general overview of political communication systems in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I describe cross-national differences in media systems, access to paid television advertising, and campaign finance laws.

The next two chapters draw on statistical large-N analyses. In Chapter 5, I examine the ways in which political communication institutions affect cross-national differences in turnout in democratic elections. Using what I term a "mobilization" perspective, I argue that turnout is increased in institutional settings designed to facilitate electioneering communication between political parties/candidates and voters, reducing information costs. To test these assertions, I use robust regression analysis to examine country-level data. The major empirical findings are two-fold. First, turnout is higher in the countries with campaign finance systems that allow more money to enter election campaigns. Second, while public broadcasting clearly promotes higher levels of turnout, it also modifies the effect of paid advertising access on turnout. The results demonstrate that the structure and means of conveyance of political messages matter to democratic citizens.

In the second statistical analysis chapter, I focus on the following question; how do political communication systems modify the effect of individual-level characteristics such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status on individuals' propensity to vote? I attempt to determine whether different configurations of media systems and campaign regulations affect the participation gap across social classes. I argue that political information systems that lower information costs for voters mitigate the effect of socioeconomic status on political participation, thus promoting equal participation. Employing hierarchical models, I analyze pooled comparative survey data of 32 electoral democracies. The data are taken from my original dataset of political communication systems (media systems, political paid television advertising, and campaign finance laws)

and the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES Module 2- 2001-2006).   The findings show that socioeconomic bias in voter participation is significantly mitigated by public broadcasting and access to paid TV ads. My research further indicates that the effects of age and party contact are conditioned by various aspects of political communication systems.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I provide a synthesized review of the empirical results in the conclusion. Especially I discuss their implications for future studies of political communication and political behavior.

Chapter 2:   Media, State, and Democratic Citizens

Graber (1993, 305) defines political communication as "the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of messages that are likely to have a significant impact on politics." She argues that the key element of political communication is that political messages have a significant effect at different levels— from individuals to whole societies. Political scientists and communication scholars alike have worked hard to figure out how political communication affects democratic political systems as well as what types of political information systems facilitate the development of a democratic citizenry (Bennett 1996, xii; Nimmo and Combs 1990; Paletz and Entman 1981; Hertsgaard 1988).

In this chapter, I place my study within the broader scholarly discussion about the role of political communication in democratic societies, and then review what we already know about relationships between the media, the state, and citizens. First, I examine the existing work on media and campaign effects from the behaviorist perspective. Second, I dissect the debate between the media malaise theory and the mobilization theory. Then, I consider how macro-level communication theories and behaviorists conceptualize an ideal environment for political communication. Finally, I introduce the research questions explored in this dissertation.

MEDIA AND CAMPAIGN EFFECTS

The potential power of the media alarmed many during the early twentieth century in Western Europe. The" hypodermic needle" theory (also referred to as the "bullet" theory or the "transmission belt" theory) presumed that communication messages had a direct and automatic effect on the audience (Berger 1995). But subsequent studies debunked this belief (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968). The classical view in political science is that the media have minimal persuasive effects on people's political attitudes and voting decisions. Bartels (1993) calls this "one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science."

The minimal effects argument started with Columbia and Michigan scholars in the 1940s and 1950s. The Columbia scholars (Berelson, Lazersfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968) found that citizens were not attentive to politics, being exposed to limited social networks dominated by a small number of elites called opinion leaders. Citizens construct patterns of social interaction that minimized their contacts with disagreeable political messages, and thus maximize polarization according to social group membership.

The Michigan scholars (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964) also determined that citizens were inattentive to and ill informed about politics. They argued that precampaign factors, such as party identification, were better voting predictors than information distributed during the campaign. They maintain that party identification, or attachment to one of the major parties, acts as a perceptual screen, prohibiting new information inconsistent with predispositions. For decades, the minimal effects argument went unchallenged. Even the emergence of the television era did not change the consensus among scholars (Patterson and McClure 1976).

Why is there a discrepancy between the general impression and the scholarly appraisal of media effects?   Bartels (1993) suggests that the previous negative findings of media effects in nonexperimental settings may be attributed to measurement error and the shortfalls of research design. Survey analysis may not disentangle media attention from other attributes, such as information holding. With measurement error adjusted, Bartels finds that the media have greater, but nonetheless modest, effects on individual political decisions. Also, he attributes small media effects to that fact that voters in presidential campaigns already have strongly held views before campaign polling starts: The decisions have already been made.

Aside from difficulties in measuring media consequences, the minimal effects argument actually tends to obscure several aspects of the Columbia and Michigan scholarship that need to be acknowledged. First, their accounts of voting actually include many short-term factors, such as campaigns and the media (Shaw 2001). Furthermore, the Columbia and Michigan studies also recognize that some population segments are

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more vulnerable to such short-term effects. Berelson, Lazersfeld, and McPhee (1954), in their study of presidential campaigns in the 1940s, suggest that people with low levels of political engagement and under cross-pressures are more likely to change their votes during a campaign and to make their decisions later than people in homogeneous circumstances.

MEDIA MALAISE VERSUS MOBILIZATION

Whereas traditional studies in political science suggest that the media have minimal or marginal effects on vote choice, a scholarly debate about media effects on a democratic citizenry ironically presumes their powerful impact in modern democracies. Generally, the debate is between the media malaise argument and the mobilization perspective. The two schools of thought disagree on how well the mass media in advanced democracies serve the needs of democratic citizens and societies.

The media malaise argument claims that the practices of contemporary news media and political campaigns lead to citizen disengagement from politics, thereby hampering political learning and political participation as well as impairing public trust in government. This line of reasoning coincides with discipline-wide concerns about citizen disillusionment with political systems in the late twentieth century. Such considerations trouble many policy makers and scholars, leading to discussions about the causes of declining civic engagement (Pharr and Putnam 2000). Numerous factors were weighted as possible causes of civic disengagement and disaffection, including the erosion of social capital, regionalism, mass media, and the decline of political parties, and the end of the Cold War and the postwar economic boom, (Pharr and Putnam 2000, xix). Interestingly, mass media happen to be one of the most popular explanations (Putnam 2000, Patterson 1994, 2002, Jamieson 1984, Jamieson and Waldman 2002).

Most of all, patterns of political communication have been transformed dramatically in the past few decades. One such change is toward deregulation of the media, which occurs in two forms: a liberalization of political control and privatization (Mughan and Gunther 2000). In a second transformation, television has become a major channel of political communication. Third, politicians' styles of electioneering have

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changed the marketing of candidates away from traditional face-to-face campaigning. New technologies have been adopted in electioneering activities, such as frequent use of television advertising, public opinion polls, telephone canvassing, and direct mail (Butler and Ranney 1992, 8). In contrast to traditional methods of personal contacting, such as rallies and canvassing, campaign messages in modern elections are not direct but rather filtered through intermediaries.

In general, these transformations have invited criticisms and have raised concerns about their alleged negative impacts on political engagement. The mass media, especially television, have been blamed as a major force transforming the relationship between the government and the people (Putnam 2000; Patterson 1994, 2002; Jamieson 1984; Jamieson and Waldman 2002). Putnam (2000) holds television responsible for the decline of social capital in America. According to him, television consumption is highly correlated with the decline in social capital and confidence in government in the United States. Postman (1995) is also critical about the role of television in modern society. He argues that "television's way of knowing is uncompromisingly hostile to typography's way of knowing: that television's conversations promote incoherence and triviality; that the phrase 'serious television' is a contradiction in terms: and that television speaks in only one persistent voice — the voice of entertainment" (80).

Patterson (1993) examines the practices of U.S. news media, arguing that they have detrimental effects on citizens. In the news media, modern politics has become more like a drama or entertainment, and the voters are spectators. When mainstream news media compete with entertainment programs, they become out of touch with what people want to hear (Fallows 1996). Drawing on what they call "a modified version of the cultivation paradigm," Moy and Pfau presume that mass media coverage affects people's perceptions about the performance of political institutions (2000, 44–46). Thus, they argue that the increasingly negative and cynical treatment of institutions by the U.S. media presents a distorted view of reality, which eventually undermines public confidence in political systems. Their empirical evidence shows that the consumption of

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network television news negatively affects viewers' evaluation of Congress and the court system.

In addition, some blame political spots for the disaffection of citizens, as TV spots "tend to emphasize the diverting over the cerebral" (Diamond and Bates 1992, 383–384) and impede "thoughtful discussion of the issues and thus trivialize politics, which in turn could lead to political alienation" (Holtz-Bacha 2003, 105). In U.S. elections, negative political advertising is especially thought to have detrimental effects on voter turnout (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1995, Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon 1999; cf., Finkel and Geer 1998, Wattenberg and Brians 1999).

The mobilization perspective, in contrast to the media malaise argument, contends that the modern mass media play a positive role in promoting political participation and engagement. Norris (2000a) views the changing trends of political communication in the 1980s and 1990s as "representing a diversification of the marketplace in terms of levels, formats and topic" rather than "an exorable downwards erosion in the standards of serious journalism" (7). She shows that along with the growth of soft news and what has been termed infotainment, serious coverage of political news, international affairs, and financial news has also increased. In another work (Norris 2000b), she demonstrates that the amount of time devoted to watching television in Britain and paying attention to television news in the United States is positively associated with levels of political interest, efficacy, knowledge, and social trust. The more that citizens watch television news, read newspapers, and pay attention to campaigns, the more knowledgeable, trusting of government, and participatory they are, Norris discerns. Flanagan (1996) finds that print and broadcast media in Japan increase the public's political knowledge, issue consistency, interest, and involvement in politics, which is indirectly expected to promote participation. Uslaner (1998) also detects no support for the claim that television viewing depresses trust and civic participation in America. Rather, his individual-level empirical findings suggest that optimism is the key factor. Hart (2002) also notes, although no empirical tests were provided, some positive aspects of a vivid presentation of political news by the mass media in the United States: "[S]ome would argue they [the news

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media] actually do the nation a service when transferring the energy of the campaign trail to viewers at home. A utilitarian might even claim that any rhetoric that succeeds in increasing voter turnout is helpful in the long run" (182).

The discrepancy between the media malaise hypothesis and the mobilization perspective may arise for several reasons. First, evidence of a political communication effect on political engagement is scattered and far from clear. Furthermore, arguments sometimes consist of only assertions rather than empirical evidence of a relationship between the performance of the media and citizen political attitudes. Second, there is no clear specification of the dependent variables. When these sources say "civic disengagement" or "political alienation," it is unclear which political attitude is affected by the media. Furthermore, there is generally a lack of distinction between short-term and long-term effects. It is reasonable to expect that media campaigns are effective in promoting voter interest and mobilizing citizens, even though in the long run they undermine confidence in government.[3] Third, many studies focus only on political communication in the U.S. news media, and to a lesser extent the media of some Western European countries. Thus, it is difficult to conclude whether their findings can be replicated in other democracies.[4] At the same time, the shortage of comparative analyses indicates that not enough attention has been paid to the possibility that the information environment may make a difference in citizen political engagement.

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[3] Åsard and Bennett (1997) suggest: "Traditional forms of communication between leaders and citizens have given way to short-term emotional media campaigns aimed at mobilizing public support for politics and votes for candidates. These battles for public opinion have undermined stable political coalitions based on earlier and more enduring governing visions. Publics increasingly view politicians with suspicion, and politicians approach publics warily with an eye to polls and news management. Citizens reinforce this vicious spiral by abandoning party loyalties and adopting centrist and increasingly personalized political outlooks" (x).

[4] When Katzenstein (2000) examined whether the findings of Putnam (2000) in the United States were replicated in other advanced democracies, he unearthed diverging trends in the trilateral democracies.

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To enhance our understanding of media effects on political engagement, it is necessary not only to employ systematic empirical tests for the clarification of specific aspects of political engagement, but also to consider cross-national variations in the political information environment.

MEDIA, STATE, AND DEMOCRACY

Even though most scholars and policy makers might agree that the media serve the "public interest," they seem to disagree on how to structure media and communication policies conducive to good democratic governance. Perhaps the dominant normative perspective is the liberal theory of the free press termed the Libertarian theory, established by Milton and Locke in the seventeenth century (Milton [1644] 1957; Locke [1689] 1960). This theory asserts that "the underlying purpose of the media was to help discover truth, to assist in the process of solving political social problems by presenting all manner of evidence and opinion as the basis for decision" (Siebert 1956, 51). Therefore, it advocates freedom from government controls of the press. Government intervention in a free exchange of ideas would distort information and hinder informed decisions by the electorate.[5] This marketplace of ideas concept basically puts trust in competition and the market; thus, all ideas, whether good or bad, should be permitted for competition. The public should pick and choose messages, not the government.

Others support a more active role of government to ensure that the media promote the ideal of public interest and to amend market failure of the media system. The public service model, or the "social responsibility" theory of the press, holds that "the government must not merely allow freedom; it must also actively promote it" (Peterson 1956, 93-95). At the extreme lie Pigouvian economists, who advocate a state monopoly

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[5] However, some categories of speech are limited, but are considered consistent with libertarian principles. They include libelous, slanderous, obscene, and indecent materials.

of the media (Djankov et al. 2003). They believe that the government can maximize public welfare by regulating communication processes.[6]

A country's political communication system reflects its institutional, economic, and historical differences as a result of adaptation to a social system. According to Lerner (1957), "a communication system is both index and agent of change in a total social system….Associated with each communication system is a "profile" of economic, political, and cultural attributes" (267). Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) also understand that a country's political communication systems are formed uniquely in a specific setting:

> Different parameters of political systems, that is, different features of structures, norms and values of political systems, will differently promote or constrain political communication roles and behaviours within those systems. Moreover, it highlights the formative influence of the political system on political communication processes as conducted through the media (74).

For example, Americans' attachment to the commercial model of broadcasting can be explained by their suspicion of strong government and "the deep cultural faith in virtually unrestricted political communication" (Bennett 1996, xii). Thus, the public service model of broadcasting is incompatible with American political culture (Mughan and Gunther 2000, 13). A country's economic capacity might also affect communication systems. Poor countries may not be able to institute commercial broadcasting outlets, leaving only the state capable of operating broadcasting.

Generally, democratic societies have developed media systems consistent with their political, cultural, and economic circumstances. Consequently, their media systems embody certain norms more than others.[7] In some countries, the liberalist perspective prevails so strongly that freedom of speech becomes the core value surrounding

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[6] Habermas (1989), on the other hand, introduced the concept of *public sphere* to depict the ideal settings for political communication, where citizens communicate without governmental interference or commercial influence. He argues that the commercialization of politics in the media can make the public sphere degenerative and artificial.

[7] McQuail (1996) suggests that the norms for media performance in a society actually reflect the core values of modern western countries – freedom, equality, and order.

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communication policies.[8] In other societies, different values such as equality, diversity, or social order gain more importance than freedom of speech, resulting in various government regulations or interventions in political communication. Apparently the ideals of free speech and equality are not totally exclusive, however. In Germany, the media and campaign regulations seem to have incorporated values of both information and equality, a method that restricts neither the amount of campaign contributions and expenditures nor access to paid TV advertising (on private channels). At the same time, the government provides public funding to political parties. As a consequence, the cost of elections in Germany is among the highest in the world.

Since the md-1990s, the number of studies examining political communication in the comparative context has increased (e.g., Norris 2002; Semetko 1996; Plasser and Plasser 2002; Swanson and Mancini 1996; Butler and Ranney 1992). Hallin and Mancini (2004) incorporate the reciprocal influence of both the media and the political system into their models based on broader cross-national differences in the nature of the state, party systems, and other elements of social and economic structure.[9] Åsard and Bennett (1997) compared how different political communication systems in Sweden and the United States affect governing ideas, rhetoric, and public policies. They find that the institutional differences in parties and electoral representation, political financing, interest groups, and the media make the two countries respond differently to innovative ideas. Semetko et al. (1991) investigate how the role of the media in the United States and Britain differ in forming campaign agendas. Dimock and Popkin (1997), while investigating cross-

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[8] For example, free speech is ranked over political equality in the United States, which was clearly demonstrated in the Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo (1976): "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of other is wholly foreign to the First Amendment" (424 U.S. 1, 1976).

[9] It is also notable that the theories of mass communication and propaganda explain media systems as a mechanism to protect the competitive political advantages of some groups over others, either by coercion or restricting access to political communication channels (Habermas 1976; Bagdikian 1987; Herman 1985).

national differences in political knowledge and media use in their seven-nation comparative study, emphasize the role of the media environment. The authors conclude that "[w]hat viewers get from TV is not determined by inherent limitations on the ability of people to absorb information they see and hear. The differences between NBC and the BBC matter" (1997, 223). In other words, information environment matters as well as individual heterogeneity in the cognitive capabilities for processing political information.

The obvious underlying assumption of those studies is that cross-national differences in political communications may yield dissimilar effects in terms of behaviors by media organizations and political actors, including the public. Few, however, offer causal analyses of the relationships among system-level factors and their effects on citizens. According to Mughan and Gunther (2000), "the literature in political science is notable for the general absence of rigorous comparative analyses of the mutually influencing interaction between the flow of political information, on the one hand, and the basic democratic character of political regimes and individual political attitudes and behavior, on the other" (1).[10]   They point out that one important obstacle blocking a deeper understanding between the two comes from the division of scholarly approaches between behaviorists and media system analysts. Therefore, the need for integrating these two perspectives is obvious in order to explore the effects of media systems on democratic citizens.

THE RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, MOBILIZATION, AND COMMUNICATION INSTITUTIONS

The preceding section presented how media theorists conceptualize a good political information system, and the role of the government in structuring political communication. What, then, are the rational choice and behaviorist approaches to a political communication system that is likely to produce an engaged citizenry? In general,

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[10] In fact, studies do exist that explore the effects of different media systems on political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Aarts and Semetko 2003; Norris 2000a, 2000b). All of those comparative works, however, employ small-*n* studies, so their empirical findings tend to lack generalizability.

behaviorists (and rational choice scholars) offer a quantitative outlook at political information systems. They suggest that an information-rich environment is beneficial for fostering political engagement and participation (Bimber 2001). The government can either limit or promote information flow. For example, campaign spending limits and bans on TV political advertisements may decrease information flow. In contrast, the provisions of public funding and free TV access for parties and candidates may increase it.

Downs (1957) postulates that a citizen's political decision making,   including the decision to get informed, engaged, and participatory in politics, is a function of cost and benefit:

> The basic rule for deciding how many data to acquire is the same. The information-seeker continues to invest resources in procuring data until the marginal return from information equals its marginal cost. At that point, assuming decreasing marginal returns or increasing marginal costs or both, he has enough information and makes his decision (215).

To collect information, scarce resources are consumed, especially the time for assimilating data and weighing alternatives. Rational citizens try to minimize the cost of information and depend mostly on free information available around them. Downs presumes political information in the mass media as free data, arguing that the majority of voters depend on free political information, both accidental and sought. He explains that "the main role of free information is a floor for all types of rational calculations, the basis for preliminary estimation of such entities as the party differential, the marginal return from information, the marginal cost of information bits, and cost of voting" (223). In this sense, the optimal environment for rational voters is one that provides abundant free information relevant to their individual decision making.

From the behaviorist camp, the mobilization perspective also emphasizes the importance of political information in political engagement-- especially in turnout (Cox and Munger 1989; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Gosnell 1927; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Hill and Leighely 1995; Gerber and Green 2000; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1998; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Vanderbok 1990). Most of

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all, this camp suggests that campaign efforts to mobilize voters increase turnout by cutting the cost of voting through providing necessary information as well as motivation (social incentives). Mobilization measured by campaign spending, party contact, or group membership can actually be interpreted as free information to voters. Like the rational choice theory, this perspective suggests that the volume or availability of campaign information is an essential determinant of political engagement, and that an information-rich environment would increase levels of political participation.

Although the rational choice theory and the mobilization perspective each illuminate the importance of an information-rich environment for democratic citizens, they tend to overlook specific institutional aspects of political communication. The legal regulations on media outlets and the rules governing the conduct of partisan politics would constitute an information environment for democratic citizens, which bear upon my analysis of political engagement. Institutions, in general, provide "a distinctive national matrix of sanctions and incentives that militate toward some kinds of behavior and away from others" (Hall 1997, 181). The institutions of political communication would play a key role in structuring media markets and regulating media and campaign activities. To locate communication systems best suited to the needs of democratic governance and an engaged citizenry, we must turn to the institutional settings surrounding media and campaign communication.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

I have examined the findings of existing studies about the effects of political communication on citizens at both individual and societal levels. Media messages have moderate, if not marginal, effects on mass attitudes and behavior, especially on vote choice. The effects of news media and electoral campaigns on political engagement are, however, still controversial, leading to the question whether different configurations of political communication systems will make a difference —and how. The macro communication theories, on the other hand, present contrasting perspectives on the structure of political communication systems and the proper role of the government in regulating them. The rational choice theory provides the theoretical

background of this study. Individuals are rational actors who try to minimize the information costs of political engagement. Therefore, political information systems that lower information costs for voters should promote political participation.

Many important issues involving the role of political communication systems in elections are still being debated, however. This dissertation aims to address the following questions with the data collected by the author, present empirical findings based on statistical methods, and discuss implications of the findings for policy makers:

- How should we specify and measure political communication systems?
- How do countries differ in regulating media systems and campaign communication?
- What are the effects of different political communication systems on voter participation?
- What types of political communication are likely to promote voter turnout?
- How does the effect of different types of communication systems interact with individual characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, on individual levels of political participation?

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Chapter 3: Explaining Voter Participation

Political scientists have identified various individual and system level factors that influence political participation. Among different types of political activities, voter turnout has gained the most attention. Why do people vote? In American politics, interest in voter participation was propelled by substantially low levels of voter turnout in U.S. elections.[11] Voter turnout matters not only because it constitutes the essence of democratic political functioning, but also because it affects citizen representativeness and equality in public policies (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1996). Some even suggest that low turnout might benefit one political party over another (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Highton and Wolfinger 2001; cf., Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; DeNardo 1980).

To explore why voter turnout in the United States is low, many studies turn to unique political institutional settings and electoral laws/systems in this country. For example, voter registration requirements and the single-member, simple-plurality electoral system are found to be the main turnout depressors for American voters (Powell 1986; Nagler 1991). Yet even after considering various institutional factors, U.S. turnout levels are still found to below. In fact, because of its relatively low turnout rate, Jackson (1987) includes the United States as a control variable in his turnout models of advanced democracies. In this sense, even controlling for a host of systematic and attitudinal factors fails to fully explain why U.S. turnout is so low. From my perspective, some critical variables have probably been omitted from previous studies.

One of the missing variables, I argue, is institutional characteristics surrounding electioneering communication. Indeed, the United States is noted for its distinct systems of mass media and electoral campaigns. The U.S. media markets are extremely diverse,

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[11]   Note, however that the U.S. voter turnout has undergone some dynamic changes. It declined between 1960 and 1988 (cf., McDonald and Popkin), and increased noticeably in 1992, and then resurged in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections. The turnout in 2008 marked the highest since 1960.

and all the media organizations are owned by private entities. Campaigns turn to media-centered campaigns, including political spots, for delivering their messages. In terms of campaign funding, political parties/individual candidates themselves are responsible for securing campaign money, because little public financing is available.[12] Recently, the so-called American-style political communication has been emulated in many other democracies. Yet many cross-national differences exist in the structures and styles of news media and electoral campaigns at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s (Mancini and Swanson 1996). In many countries, public broadcasting channels remain dominant, campaigns rely on traditional methods of electioneering, television advertising is either banned or used in a limited way, and public financing subsidizes the expenses of political parties and campaigns. How do such different settings of political communication systems affect political participation? Is the uniqueness of American media systems responsible for its low turnout? In this chapter, I review the existing theories of voter participation and introduce my theory and hypotheses on the relationship between different elements of political communication systems and voter turnout.

RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH

Extant discussion of the proper role of government in regulating the media focuses broadly on the effects of mass media on effective democratic governance. Note the implicit assumption that political engagement and participation is imperative in this equation. Yet studies of engagement and participation – which typically focus on electoral turnout – often begin by asking why turnout is so low. The dominant theoretical response concentrates on the costs versus benefits of voting. For instance, Downs' (1957) study on the rationality of voting asks why people vote, positing that an individual's decision to participate is a function of the cost and benefit of voting. People vote if and only if the benefit exceeds the cost. [13] Political participation incurs costs. Among them,

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[12] Only presidential candidates are entitled certain public financing in both primary and general elections (with some restrictions).

[13] In Down's voting calculus, because a citizen's probability of affecting an election outcome is infinitesimal, nonvoting is a rational decision by voters. In reality, however,

what Downs emphasizes is information costs. For a citizen to participate, s/he needs to get informed about many things—issues, candidates, time and place to vote, etc.

The rational actor approach provides a general law (or mechanism) that governs individuals' decision to vote. It can provide a framework to understand who votes and under what conditions people are more (or less) likely to vote. The rational choice approach suggests that individual propensity to vote and cross-national turnout differences are based on the costs and benefits of voting which are conditioned by individual, social, political, and institutional factors.

INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH

Ironically, the rational choice perspective reinforces the belief of institutionalists that electoral laws and political institutions substantively condition turnout. Cross-national turnout differences are based on the distinct costs and benefits of voting conditioned by different political institutions and contexts. Registration barriers and compulsory voting, in particular, are often presumed to be the two main institutional factors affecting the cost of voting (Powell 1986; Timpone 1999; Jackman 1987; Franklin 1999; Lijphart 1997). American researchers turn to registration barriers as the primary demobilizing factor for voter turnout in the United States (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Timpone 1999). Compulsory voting is another important factor that influences voter turnout by increasing the cost of nonvoting (Powell 1982; Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 1996; Lijphart 1997; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Gosnell 1930; Tingsten 1937). Lijphart (1997) observes that the most striking finding about compulsory voting is that even low penalties for non-compliance can induce higher turnout. He argues that compulsory voting laws provide legal sanctions and enforcement to remedy the problem of collective action.

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many people do vote. Downs explains that citizens value democracy and that the long-term gain will overcome the short-term gain or loss from voting. Later studies also attempt to solve this paradox, mainly by adding additional terms to the benefit side of the calculus (e.g., Riker and Ordeshook 1973, Aldrich 1993). Or the cost and benefit is so small that people use voting as expressive or social occasion. (Aldrich 1993).

The nature of representative allocation procedures is also thought to influence voter turnout. Single-member districts and plurality systems depress voter turnout, as many electoral contests are foregone conclusions (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Franklin 1996). Similarly, the parliament structure also affects turnout, since it should be higher in a unicameral system than in a bicameral one. Unicameral elections increase not only the decisiveness of elections in government formation, but also the expected policy outcomes, through the political process (Jackman 1987).

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS/CIVIC VOLUNTARISM MODEL

Turnout studies are not the exclusive province of rational choice theorists and institutionalists, however. In fact, behaviorists have produced at least as much research on the causes of voting. For instance, the socioeconomic status (SES) model is one of the strongest for explaining who votes and who does not. It posits that socioeconomic factors such as education, income, and occupation are the strongest correlates of turnout in the United States and other democracies (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1996; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Leighley and Nagler 1992 — in U.S. elections; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Finkel 1987— in other democracies). People in the higher socioeconomic ladder participate more politically than those in the lower SES.

Verba and Nie explain the link between socioeconomic status and participation:

> [T]he higher-status individual has a greater stake in politics, he has greater skills, more resources, greater awareness of political matter, he is exposed more communications about politics, he interacts with others who participate… Individuals of higher social status develop such civic orientations as concern for politics, information, and feelings of efficacy, and these orientations in turn lead to participation (Verba and Nie 1972, 126).

In short, social environment, resources and skills along with psychological characteristics are connective links between SES and participation. Despite its robust prediction to the likelihood of participation, however, a standard socioeconomic status

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model lacks a compelling theoretical explanation why higher SES leads to political participation – the mechanism linking social statues to activity (cf., Hillygus 2005).[14]

On the other hand, the civic voluntarism model, on the other hand, borrows the rational actor approach's theoretical richness with empirical power and political relevance of the SES model. It combines three essential factors affecting participation—resources, political engagement, and mobilization. People participate because they can, want, and asked to. Moving from the SES factors to resources (time, money, and civil skills), which are allegedly at higher level of abstraction and generality, it posits that resources play like a budget constraint for political participation like in a microeconomic model. The concept of resource, due to its abstraction and generality, come near to the causal relation to political participation.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION APPROACH

Mobilization also affects political participation. Candidates, parties, interest groups and activists urge citizens to participate. The political mobilization theory emphasizes the role of party and candidate outreach for turnout. This approach emphasizes political leaders' strategies as well as political contexts. More specifically, political mobilization affects the cost of voting by providing necessary information as well as motivation (social incentives). The mechanism behind mobilization is mostly quoted as subsidization of cost. Mobilization reduces information cost by informing related issues and sometimes material costs—for example, providing transformation to the poll box.

Many empirical studies show that campaign activities, in particular, have significant mobilizing effects (e.g., Gosnell 1927; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Gerber and Green 2000; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Cox and Munger 1989; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1998; Whiteley and Seyd 1994). While

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[14] Hillygus (2005), exploring the missing link between higher education and political engagement, finds that language and civic skill developed through higher education promote future political engagement.

most mobilization studies have been conducted on U.S. political campaigns, some cross-national studies demonstrate that institutional factors have implications for elite mobilization efforts. For example, district magnitudes influence politicians' campaign strategies. Larger district sizes will bring about nationally competitive districts, which make political parties less likely to neglect some districts while emphasizing others (Powell 1986).

UNEQUAL PARTICIPATION

Participatory inequality as well as low levels of voter turnout has been one of the most serious problems afflicting many democracies. The demographic distribution of the participants indicates a high correlation between socioeconomic status and political participation. Rich, educated, white collar professionals are overrepresented among political activists. In particular, low turnout is problematic as it could facilitate unequal participation, which disadvantages less well-to-do citizens. This is especially true for very low turnout elections, which generally display higher biases in social class compositions. Many studies have shown that elected officials tend to listen to those who vote rather than those who do not. Also, they acknowledge that policy preferences and priorities are different between high SES and low SES citizens (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

The socioeconomic status model predicts such unequal participation, however, the relative importance of individual socioeconomic factors differs across countries (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Finkel 1987; Jennings 1997). Verba Nie, and Kim (1978) find that individual factors are particularly influential for American voters in comparison with those in other countries. More specifically, the disparity in participation between the haves and have-nots indicates a large gap in U.S. elections.

Where does this difference come from? Why do some countries have a higher level of inequality in voter participation than others? Lijphart (1997) argues that institutional mechanisms such as easier registration rules, proportional representation, and less frequent elections should solve the problem of inequality in voting. In particular,

he suggests that compulsory voting "by making voting participation as equal as possible, it is a valuable partial option" (11).

Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), on the other hand, suggest that weak party-group affiliation widens the socioeconomic gap among voters and nonvoters in the United States more than in Austria and Japan, where individual variables play smaller roles because of the strong social group-party affiliation. Other institutional factors also affect the SES disparity between voters and nonvoters. In American elections, Highton (1997) finds that the presence (or absence) of registration restrictions affects socioeconomic groups unevenly. The turnout gaps between the lower and higher educated groups are shown to be smaller in North Dakota and states with election-day registration. In a similar vein, Wolfinger and Rogenstone (1980) suggest that registration barriers affect most severely lower SES groups because it disproportionately raises costs for them. Easing the law, they predicted, would boost participation rates for the less educated, as voting does not demand much time, skill, or money, compared to other forms of political activities. [15] These findings offer some implications for the effect of political communication systems. It is said that mobilization subsidizes cost of participation. If so, the political information environment might have a greater impact on lower SES voters. This expectation is plausible in considering the learning curve as well. If a person has little prior information, new information should have a larger impact, whereas a person with a high level of information will not react to new information as much. Also, voting is the most egalitarian form of political participation. Everyone has one vote, while campaign activities and campaign contributions assume a high level of inequality. In sum, the political communication environment will have a stronger influence on voters with lower levels of political information, motivation, and skills.

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[15] Berinsky (2005), by contrast, finds an opposite effect of electoral reforms. He finds that the ease of registration laws actually increased socioeconomic biases rather than reduced them.

THEORY AND GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

Regarding the effects of the political information environment, the rational choice perspective and some behavioral approaches offer a quantitative outlook at political information systems and suggest that information-rich environments promote political engagement and participation by lowering information costs for the electorate (Bimber 2001). Little systematic evidence has been offered on how different configurations of media markets and campaign regulations influence voter turnout, however.[16]

Focusing on the informational role of the media during election campaigns, I assume that individuals are rational and respond to the incentive structures around them. If the costs of obtaining political information are sufficiently low, they are likely to become informed. Similarly, if the benefits of being engaged are manifest, they are likely to follow political campaigns and, in the end, vote. I also assume that the state can influence this decision calculus significantly. I am agnostic, however, about whether state involvement, per se, helps or hurts turnout. What matters should be the nature of the government's regulations, not the mere fact of governmental interference; effects depend on whether specific government policies increase or decrease information costs and benefits for voters. I rely on the rational actor approach, because it provides a general law (mechanism) that governs the behaviors of individuals as far as the questions of how and why participate are concerned. The theoretical parsimony of this approach explains various factors' effects on participation. SES, mobilization, institutions all act to increase or decrease the cost (benefit) of participation.

Therefore, I hypothesize that political communication systems that lower information costs for voters produce higher turnout levels. Institutional settings designed to facilitate electioneering communication between political parties/candidates and voters

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[16] Mughan and Gunther (2000) suggested that "the literature in political science is notable for the general absence of rigorous comparative analyses of the mutually influencing interaction between the flow of political information, on the one hand, and the basic democratic character of political regimes and individual political attitudes and behavior, on the other" (1). They pointed out that one important obstacle blocking a deeper understanding between the two comes from the division of scholarly approaches between behaviorists and media system analysts.

will increase political engagement by lowering information cost and motivating the electorate. I also expect that political communication systems will modify the effect of an individual's socioeconomic status on voting. Because low SES citizens face higher levels of information costs due to their social settings and resources, political communication institutions that lower information costs for voters will promote equal participation.

Having presented my theory and general hypothesis, I now offer some working hypotheses regarding the effects of specific institutional characteristics of the country's political communication systems on voter turnout.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND VOTER TURNOUT: HYPOTHESES

As mentioned earlier, a systematic approach to the exploration of how different systems of political communication affect voter turnout requires an amalgamation of behaviorist and institutionalist approaches. However, specifying political communication systems is a difficult task. As Gunther and Mughan (2000) note, political communication systems are "subtly nuanced and [are] conditioned on a number of characteristics of individual countries" (402). Despite this observation, investigating the institutions governing political communication helps enable a truly systematic comparative study, as institutions are relatively objective, comparable, and manageable entities.[17] I argue that the institutional settings of the media, political television advertising, and campaign finance are among the most important areas in which behaviorist and institutionalist perspectives can be usefully merged.

The media system sets the environment for "earned" or "free media," where political messages are formed through media organizations. Given that most citizens gather their political information from the news media, the characteristics of media systems can affect many aspects of political communication, and thus the overall quality of political discourse. Ultimately, these systems influence the amount of political

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[17] Asard and Bennett suggest that comparative media studies need to conceptualize, select, and analyze data that have the equivalence of comparisons; that is, "What factors vary measurably across political systems to permit comparative analysis?"(1997, 35).

information provided to the public, as well as the substance and range of both campaign and non-campaign messages.

Campaign finance laws and regulations on televised political advertising, on the other hand, influence the so-called "paid media," where political elites directly control electioneering messages. Because campaign finance laws control the amount and sources of campaign advertising, they should have a tremendous impact on information exchanged during political campaigns. Legal regulations on paid television advertising also seem critical. In many democracies, political television advertising has become a prominent element of electioneering communication, but its effects on voters are still controversial.

I shall now examine the previous scholarly literature on the effects of each measure of political communication institutions on voter turnout and then provide my hypotheses for them.

Media Systems and Voter Turnout

Countries have developed distinct media system characteristics conditioned by their own political, economic, and cultural backgrounds. Specifying a universal media system variable across countries is a daunting task, not only because of complexity, but also because of the possible correlations between a country's media system and its political, economic, and social systems. Hallin and Mancini (2004) present a comparative study of media systems in eighteen Western European and North American democracies, exploring the question, "Why is the press as it is?" They identify three media-system models using four dimensions of media systems: (1) the development of mass press, (2) political parallelism, (3) the development of journalistic professionalism, and (4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.

In this study, I consider three aspects of media systems: (1) broadcasting system, (2) development of the newspaper markets, and (3) a partisan press.[18] The first dimension

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[18] The measures of media systems draw largely on Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Norris (2002).

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of media systems, the broadcasting system, taps who owns major broadcasting companies in the country. In some nations (e.g., the United States, Turkey, and Peru), broadcasting markets are organized on free-market principles and thus are owned by private entities. By contrast, public broadcasting outlets get their funding from the public based on the idea that broadcasting is a public utility.[19]

The structure of broadcasting systems has drawn significant attention from many scholars and experts, especially since the 1980s when most West European countries introduced private channels to their predominantly public systems (e.g., Papathanassopoulos 2002; de Bens and de Smaele 2001). In fact, the development of private broadcasting systems has invited criticism, most of which centers on the structure of funding. Critics argue that the pressure for ratings downgrades the quality and diversity of programming and at the same time increases preferences for sensational coverage of political news (Blumler, Brynin, and Nossiter 1986; Entman 1989; Weymouth and Lamizet 1996). Public broadcasting channels, on the other hand, tend to provide more information about public affairs and elections with a greater degree of substance and diversity (Semetko et al. 1991). According to Abramson (1990), "'feel good' news has to be in principle superficial, episodic, unengaging, and undemanding. It can flatter the culture, but not examine it; it can please viewers but not make them think" (262–263). Papathanassopulos (2002) observes: "In an intensively competitive environment, it seems that broadcasters are placing more emphasis on local, human-interest stories" (21).

Some studies actually find that public broadcasting promotes political engagement (Curran et al. 2009; Dimock and Popkin 1997; Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2001; Moy and Pfau 2000; cf., Aarts and Semetko 2003; Norris 2000b). A commercial system's tendency toward adversarial and dramatic coverage of political events may impair citizens' trust and confidence in government because it emphasizes the shortfalls

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[19] The funding sources for public broadcasting include television license fees, state subsidies, and voluntary donations.

of the political system, depicting politicians as caring only about winning elections. Curran et al. (2009) explore how market-driven media influence levels of citizens' political knowledge by comparing four countries (Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). They find that public-service broadcasting fosters an informed citizenry and that it narrows the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged. In a similar vein, Moy and Pfau (2000) find that watching news in private channels undermined confidence in political institutions, whereas watching public news channels strengthened it. Pfetsch (1991) shows that a preference for commercial television is associated with low levels of news consumption, political interest, and political efficacy. Schulz (1998) also finds a negative relationship between individuals' preferences for commercial television channels and political competence (interest and internal political efficacy). Similarly, Norris (1997) finds that viewing public broadcasting news is associated with higher levels of information, while viewing commercial broadcasting news is not.[20]

Considering that public broadcasting provides this additional level of information on current affairs and electoral coverage when compared to private broadcasting, I assume that it lowers information costs. Hence, public broadcasting is likely to be associated with higher voter turnout.

As for newspaper readership, many studies have noted that it promotes citizens' political knowledge and engagement (e.g., Feldman and Kawakami 1991; Gordon and Segura 1997; Luskin 1990). Thus, a higher newspaper subscription rate is expected to be positively associated with turnout. A partisan press, on the other hand, looks at the relationships between news organizations and major political actors including the government, political parties, and major social groups. This approach corresponds with

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[20] Other studies, however, do not find such effects. Aarts and Semetko (2003) demonstrate that media use (both in public and private television watching) does not have a significant effect on political engagement (confidence in government). Moreover, Norris (2000b) shows that media consumption is a strong predictor of higher levels of confidence in government regardless of the types of broadcasting channels using the 1998 American National Election Study and the 1996 Eurobarometer.

Hallin and Mancini's (2004) measure of "political parallelism," although their measure is more comprehensive. Some countries traditionally have developed highly partisan and politicized news media, while others have aimed for more objective journalism (e.g., the United States).[21] Hallin and Mancini (2004) note that a partisan press strengthens "the bonds between citizens and parties," thereby reinforcing ideological predispositions of the readers (158). Considering the more active mobilizing functions of a partisan press as well as individuals' tendency toward selective exposure, countries with a partisan press will likely have higher rates of voter turnout (Van Kempen 2006, 2007).

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Media systems that supply more public affairs information promote turnout and equal participation. More specifically, newspaper readership, partisan press, and a public broadcasting system will have positive effects on turnout.

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Media systems that supply more public affairs information will promote equal participation and thus mitigate the effect of education and income on individuals' propensity to vote.

TV Advertising and Voter Turnout

With respect to paid political advertising, existing studies tend to evaluate cognitive, affective, or behavioral impacts at the individual level. Societal-level effects remain an open question, but mainly negative consequences have been advanced (Holtz-Bacha 2003). Critics argue that political spots impede "thoughtful discussion of the issues and thus trivialize politics, which in turn could lead to political alienation" (Holtz-Bacha 2003, 105). The assumption is that citizens take political advertising no more seriously than they do any other television commercial, as political advertisements often resemble commercials for ordinary products.

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[21] Objective (or "Anglo-American" style) journalism does not mean that "it is literally "value free" or without viewpoints. …[T]hese media position themselves as "catchall" media cutting across the principal lines of division between the established political forces in society" (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 210).

The short length of political commercials in particular has been severely criticized, as it is believed that a substantive discussion of politics would be impossible in such a minimal time. Others also fear that political spots dry up campaign money that could be used for participation-oriented activities such as canvassing and phone banks, thereby driving voters away from the polls (Diamond and Bates 1992, 375)

The prediction of a negative relationship between political advertising and political engagement, however, has not received clear-cut confirmation, and the evidence is contradictory.[22] Some experts assert that shorter spots are even more effective in attracting audience attention and activating interest in campaigns. According to Diamond and Bates (1992), the short length does not necessarily mean shallowness, because "long is not invariably thoughtful. Longer spots often are no more than feel-good music videos, concentrating on the candidate's background and family with only passing mention of issues. They also attract smaller audiences" (379). In this regard, we cannot be assured that short spots are a problem and that longer ones serve democracy better. In this sense, it is more questionable that longer spots, which usually consist of tedious candidate statements and less stimulating visual presentation, could reach the electorate better.

Indeed, many empirical studies find that political advertising actually increases turnout (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004; Finkel and Geer 1998; cf., Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1994; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon 1999). Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein (2004) argue that political ads fulfill a vital function by fostering an attentive, informed, and participatory citizenry.

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[22] Another interesting debate about the effects of political advertising in American politics concerns the alleged demobilizing effects of negative campaign ads. Some scholars found that exposure to negative advertisements decreases levels of turnout by increasing cynicism (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1995, 1999, Kahn and Kenney 1999) But other studies show a null effect or even positive effects for negative campaign advertisements (Wattenberg and Brians 1999; Finkel and Geer 1998). Meanwhile, Kahn and Kenney (1999) made a subtler distinction regarding negative ads. They found that the influence of negative campaigning on turnout does not have a uniform effect: Legitimate criticisms increase voter turnout, and unsubstantiated and irrelevant attacks decrease it.

They view campaign advertisements as information supplements: "Ultimately, if the political diet of most Americans is lacking crucial information, campaign ads represent the multivitamins of American politics" (725). In a similar vein, Pipkin and Bartle (2002) also suggest that with adequate safeguards, "a system of spot ads may help promote interest in politics" (194). Diamond and Bates (1992) point out that "a strident ad battle may also alert inattentive citizens and, in turn, increase turnout. At the close of a blistering campaign for governor of Florida in 1986, the conventional wisdom held that voters would show their disgust by staying home; instead 61 percent came to the polls, six points above the state's average for off-year elections" (376).

Furthermore, evidence for the argument that TV spots drive money from traditional participation-oriented activities is ambivalent. Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) suggests that even in the United States in 1988, political advertising "accounted for less than a tenth of the total sum spent on all electoral campaigns for public office" (82). Especially in close elections, labor-intensive methods of electioneering such as canvassing are still prevalent in most of the world. Still, it might be a reasonable expectation that some tradeoffs exist between the prominence of media-oriented campaigning and that of labor-intensive electioneering, because campaign resources for political parties and candidates are always limited.

Given the conflicting theories and evidence, it is difficult to predict how access to paid political advertising affects voter turnout on an international level. Yet it is likely that political advertising constitutes a good source of campaign information for the electorate and is especially effective in activating voters. Thus, I expect that allowing paid television advertising during election campaigns will increase voter turnout.

In addition, the effect of access to paid television advertising is contingent upon a country's broadcasting system because the use of paid advertisements depends on the availability of private broadcasting outlets (Plasser and Plasser 2002). In many countries, paid political advertising is permitted only on private broadcasting channels, although there may be some level of governmental regulation. Therefore, the use of political advertising is highly limited in countries with strong public broadcasting channels (such

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as Austria, Germany, New Zealand, and South Korea), while many privately owned systems provide unlimited access to paid advertising (Grant 2005; Austin and Tjernström 2003).

Regarding the way in which the consequences of access to paid advertising varies by broadcasting system, some may expect a positive interaction effect between access to paid advertising and private broadcasting systems because private systems provide more outlets (and/or less regulation) for political parties and candidates to purchase television spots, thereby producing more campaign information for voters. In contrast, others may predict that the modifying effect of private broadcasting systems on access to paid television advertising will be negative, because the presence of television commercials in private broadcasting systems may make the mode of contacts between political parties and voters less personal. Higher levels of media commercialization are expected to increase a political party's use of mass media during elections, which may reduce resources that could be used for more traditional and labor-intensive modes of campaigning.   Some studies suggest that media-centered campaigns fail to mobilize voters when compared to traditional person-to-person modes of campaigning (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Since both hypotheses seem feasible, it remains unclear how broadcasting systems might modify the effects of access to paid advertising on voter turnout.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): The allowance of paid television advertising during election campaigns will increase levels of voter turnout, but its effect is modified by types of broadcasting systems.

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The availability of paid television advertising at the same time decrease the socioeconomic bias in the electorate by subsidizing the information costs for low SES citizens.

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Campaign Finance Laws and Voter Turnout

To institute transparent and fair political financing systems, many governments limit the amount of money spent on the election process. Among the various measures of campaign finance regulations, two forms of campaign finance laws are particularly important in the context of this analysis ― laws that cap campaign contributions and expenditures, and the institutional characteristics of public funding systems. Campaign finance laws affect voter turnout via the intervening factors of campaign spending and electoral competitiveness, which eventually can affect the amount and quality of campaign information and information costs for voters. While campaign spending limits decrease overall campaign spending (Gross, Goidel, and Shields 2002), public funding could, conversely, increase campaign spending and competition (Donnay and Ramsden 1995; cf., Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose 2006).[23]

Empirical studies of U.S. elections show that more campaign spending signifies higher levels of electioneering, thus activating voters (Cox and Munger 1989; Gilliam Jr. 1985; Patterson and Caldeira 1983). More recent studies have investigated the relationship between campaign finance laws and their effects more directly.   For example, using aggregate-level data Primo and Milyo (2006) found that limits on campaign contributions and spending negatively affect rates of voter turnout in gubernatorial elections, and that public funding for campaigns has a positive effect.[24]

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[23] My pilot analysis shows that campaign finance regulations are actually linked to the size of campaign expenditures. For example, the average campaign expenditure per capita of countries with direct public financing is $4.35 and for those without is $1.8 in current U.S. dollars. The average expenditure of countries that have campaign contribution or/and spending limits is $2.67 and for their counterpart is $4.63. As an indirect form of public financing, free television time does not make a difference in actual campaign expenditure.

[24]   In their individual-level data, however, the authors do not find similar effects.

Similarly, Gross and Goidel (2003) show a positive correlation between public campaign finance and voter turnout in U.S. elections.[25]

Comparative studies have rarely specified how campaign finance laws affect cross-national turnout differences. Yet, based on studies in the United States, it appears that campaign finance systems that allow more money and greater competition among candidates promote higher voter turnout and equal participation by reducing information costs. Therefore, I expect that campaign funding limits will decrease voter turnout, while public funding will result in higher turnout.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): When campaign finance laws limit campaign expenditures, they will decrease levels of voter turnout. Specifically, spending limits will decrease, and conversely public finance will increase, those levels.

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Restrictive campaign finance laws will demobilize particularly low SES citizens as compared to the high SES counterparts, thus increasing inequality of voting.

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[25] Note, however, that public financing for U.S. presidential and gubernatorial elections is unique in that it is voluntary and conditional on the acceptance of legal spending caps.

Chapter 4: Political Communication Systems

Since the 1980s, many world media markets have undergone deregulation as well as liberalization. Most Western European countries allowed private broadcasting channels to operate in their predominantly public broadcasting markets. At the same time, the so-called Americanization of political communication has become "the template for democratic elections throughout the world" (Shaw 2001, 3). The Americanization of campaigns is characterized by the prominent role of television, the prevalence of images over issues, and the professionalization of electoral campaigns (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Plasser and Plasser 2002). In a sense, political communication appears to be undergoing a process of depoliticization, in which market forces are gaining more power over political efforts. Ironically, governmental roles regulating the conduct of political communication also increased in the same period (Swanson and Mancini 1996). The complex nature of electoral processes in contemporary societies requires governments to intervene in both the media and campaigns (Åsard and Bennett 1997). Despite such homogenizing transformations of political communication patterns, cross-national differences in communication systems still remain significant. Åsard and Bennett note that "[d]espite the limiting tendencies in the exchange of ideas in the modern democratic market place, there still appear to be substantial differences in the production of ideas and the formation of political agendas from one polity to another" (1997, 30).

The main goal of this chapter is to provide snapshots of different aspects of political communication systems in the early 2000s. I examine how 74 democracies organize and regulate the political communication systems of mass media and electioneering communications. In the following, I offer a general overview of political communication systems in electoral democracies as of the late 1990s and early 2000s. More specifically, I describe the media systems, access to paid TV advertising, and campaign finance laws.

Table 4-1 List of 74 Countries by World Region

Africa (4)	Americas (22)	East/Central Europe and Middle East (22)	West Europe (16)
Ghana	Argentina	Albania	Austria
Mauritius	Bolivia	Armenia	Belgium
South Africa	Brazil	Bulgaria	Denmark
Zambia	Canada	Croatia	Finland
	Chile	Cyprus	France
	Colombia	Czech Republic	Germany
	Costa Rica	Estonia	Greece
	Dominican Republic	Georgia	Ireland
	Ecuador	Hungary	Italy
	El Salvador	Israel	Netherlands
Asia Pacific (10)	Guatemala	Latvia	Norway
Australia	Honduras	Lithuania	Portugal
India	Jamaica	Macedonia	Spain
Japan	Mexico	Moldova	Sweden
South Korea	Nicaragua	Mongolia	Switzerland
Malaysia	Panama	Poland	United Kingdom
New Zealand	Paraguay	Romania	
Philippines	Peru	Russia	
Sri Lanka	Trinidad and Tobacco	Slovakia	
Taiwan	United States	Slovenia	
Thailand	Uruguay	Turkey	
	Venezuela	Ukraine	

MEDIA SYSTEMS

     The media system is essential to describing political communication. Most citizens gather information about public affairs from mass media such as newspapers, television, and the internet. Especially in modern societies, the role of television is critical as an intermediary between political elites and the public.[26] Drawing on Hallin and

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[26] The average television watching time is 194 minutes, or 3 hours and 23 minutes per day in 72 countries in the world (Eurodata 2003). What is more striking is that TV

Mancini (2004) and Norris (2000), I examine three aspects of media systems – (1) broadcasting, (2) newspaper market development, and (3) press politicization.

Broadcasting Systems

From the beginning, broadcasting has been heavily regulated by the government in almost all countries. The relative strength of governmental (or market) influences varies across individual countries, however. In some (the United States, Turkey, and Mexico), broadcasting is organized based on free- market principles. By contrast, many other countries relied, until recently, on the idea that broadcasting is a public utility – establishing it as a public service model (Hoynes 1994).

Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, Western European countries had "pure public" systems of broadcasting, financed by licensing fees (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). Since the 1980s, most of these countries have introduced private channels into their predominantly public systems. The pace of deregulation in Western European television markets differs from country to country, though. The two earliest countries were the United Kingdom in 1954 and Italy in 1976. While most deregulation began in the 1980s and early 1990s, Austria was the last Western European country to join the process in 1999 (Papathanassopoulos 2002, 15). As a result, all Western European countries have adopted "dual" systems, where the public-service channels coexist with commercial or private channels (Blumler, Brynin, and Nossiter 1986). As of the late 1990s, the average number of public channels in fourteen West European countries is 2.64 and that of private channels is 3.64.

Despite such a worldwide commercialization trend, cross-national variation is still evident (Papathanassopoulos 2002, 15). A broadcasting system can be viewed with respect to ownership of the major broadcasting companies in the country. Who owns how much of the media industry should make a difference in the content and strategies of

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watching time has been ever increasing. According to the *One Television in the World*, the average viewing time has increased about 9 % during 1995 and 2002, while the Japanese are the most vivid television consumers, and that the Thai have the lowest viewing rates (Eurodata/Mediametrie 2002, 15).

politicians, as ownership means control. Some argue that state ownership can be interpreted as government intervention in programming and content (Djankov et al. 2003). Especially in undemocratic countries, state ownership of the media indicates control of political information. Most of the time, the government is not bipartisan, and thus governmental intervention can distort political messages.[27] In advanced democracies, however, government regulations themselves do not mean that freedom of the press is limited. In many cases, government regulations in broadcasting are formulated to prevent arbitrary intervention by the state and to ensure a plurality of voices. Given that my research is limited to the countries that guarantee a certain level of freedom of speech (i.e., categorized as partly free/free by Freedom House and the Polity IV score higher than 0), broadcasting ownership should generally indicate how much commercial interest is incorporated into programming and content of the programs.

Generally speaking, the rationales for the broadcasting regulations are promoting public service ideals and handling with scarce radio frequencies. For example, the British Broadcasting Company was established as a broadcasting monopoly in 1922 in the United Kingdom (Grant 2006. 1010). John Reith, the BBC's first director, set up as the mission of the BBC "to inform, educate, and entertain," which has become a standard for other public broadcasting companies in the world. Public channels are expected to provide "culturally elevating programming over truly popular" (Grant 2006, 1010).

The critical difference between public and private media is the structure of funding. Private television is under profit pressure to produce programs that attract as large an audience as possible. Thus, private broadcasting companies have different motivations than their public broadcasting counterparts in terms of selection, styles, and presentation of news. Private channels tend to operate based on a market mechanism rather than by political or public interest. As a result, the private system will be more

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[27] State ownership does not cover all government control of the media. Various other ways of intervention exist, such as direct subsidies, advertising revenues, and restricted access to newsprint.

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competitive, volatile, diverse, and dynamic. In the end, the type of broadcasting system affects both the style and content of political messages in the media.

Broadcasting systems in the early 2000s

Djankov et al. (2003) compiled a dataset measuring broadcasting ownership by percentage of privately (or publicly) owned television stations out of the five largest stations by viewership in 1999, which basically taps the degree of private (or public) broadcasting audience share in a country. One may suspect that their measurement method of broadcasting ownership may not adequately represent the level of media exposure-- that is, how do we know if they correspond with the size of audience for public television channels or private channels in the country? To verify that these variables used in their study represent the size of corresponding audience share, I examined the public television audience shares of countries using the Eurodata/Mediametrie's international television audience data of 2002. The results confirm that the broadcasting system variables used in the analysis represent corresponding television audience size effectively. Of the 74 countries, I could not obtain reliable data for eight countries (Albania, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago). As a result, the public broadcasting audience share of 66 countries will be discussed (See Figure 4-1).

Public broadcasting audience shares range from 0% to 100% with a mean of 44% and a standard deviation of 32. These numbers indicate that world broadcasting systems have become significantly commercialized as of the late 1990s and early 2000s. For the conventional three categories of broadcasting systems-- state/public, mixed, and private-- the mean public broadcasting audience shares are 50, 31, and 6 %, respectively. The estimated differences between the three different systems are statistically significant at p=0.05.

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Figure 4-1 Public Broadcasting Audience Share

The pattern of broadcasting systems shows some geographical clusters. Nine of the ten pure private systems (i.e., 0 % public audience share) are located in America (cf., Turkey). Furthermore, four out of the five countries with more than 90 %, but less than 100%, of private broadcasting audience share are located in South America (i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela; cf., Greece). In summary, 87% of the countries with a dominant private system are located in the Americas. While the private broadcasting system prevails in America, a different pattern is found among African countries. Three of the four African countries in the analysis (Mauritius, South Africa, and Zambia) have a state monopoly of their broadcasting systems. All of their top five broadcasting outlets are owned by the state. Ghana is the only African country adopting a dual system, in which the state owns a 33 % share of the broadcasting market. Other regions (including Europe, Asia, and Oceania) generally have dual broadcasting systems, where public and private outlets coexist.

Newspaper Readership

The second dimension of the media system, newspaper market development represents the size of daily newspaper readership in a country. According to the World Development Indicator 2000, cross-national variation in the number of daily newspaper subscribers per 1,000 people is quite substantial. While the average number of newspaper subscribers in 74 countries in my data is 152, the standard deviation is 131. Georgia has six subscribers per 1,000 people, while Norway has the largest readership with 569 subscribers, followed by Japan with 566.

Figure 4-2 Number of Newspaper Subscribers per 1000 People in 2000

Political Press vs. Objective Press

The degree of politicization of the media can be assessed with different components – "media content," "organizational connections," "partisanship of media audience," and "journalistic role orientations and practices" (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 28-29). Some countries traditionally have highly partisan or politicized journalism, while others aim for objective journalism (e.g., the U.S.). According to Hallin and Mancini:

> One of the most obvious differences among media systems lies in the fact that media in some countries have distinct political orientations, while in media in other countries do not... [In] many European countries, they are likely to move on fairly quickly to identifying newspapers by their political orientations – in Germany, the Frankurter Allegemeine is right of center, the Sűddenutsche Zeitung left of center; Die Welt further still to the right and the Frankfurter Rundschau further to the left… Even though the true party press has almost disappeared , and even if the political tendencies of European newspapers are fuzzier today than they were a generation ago, distinct political tendencies persist, more in some countries than in others – and not only in newspapers, but in many cases in electronic media as well. In the United States, no one could coherently map the politics of the media in this way; those on the left of the spectrum are likely to tell you that all the media slant to the right, and those on the right that they slant to the left (27).

After reading the existing literature on journalistic characteristics in the countries, I categorized them as political press and nonpolitical press. If a country's press is explicitly partisan in the news content, and/or affiliated with political organizations, and/or under strong government intervention, I labeled it as a political press system, and other countries as a nonpolitical press.

A majority of the countries have a political press rather than a nonpolitical counterpart. Sixty-two percent indicate partisan or political journalism, while thirty eight nonpolitical journalism. Political parallelism exists either in the form of a partisan press or state intervention. Outside Western Europe and North America, close affiliations between the press and political parties or interest groups are found in many countries, including Armenia, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, and Japan.

Table 4-2 Political Press and Objective Press in 74 Countries

Political Press (*n*=46)		Objective Press (*n*=28)
Albania	New Zealand	Argentina
Armenia	Nicaragua	Australia
Austria	Norway	Canada
Belgium	Paraguay	Costa Rica
Bolivia	Philippines	Croatia
Brazil	Poland	Czech Republic
Bulgaria	Slovakia	Dominican Republic
Chile	Slovenia	El Salvador
Colombia	South Africa	Estonia
Cyprus (Greek)	Spain	Finland
Denmark	Sri Lanka	Georgia
Ecuador	Sweden	Germany
France	Switzerland	Ireland
Ghana	Ukraine	Jamaica
Greece	United Kingdom	Latvia
Guatemala	Uruguay	Lithuania
Honduras	Venezuela	Mauritius
Hungary	Zambia	Mexico
India		Panama
Israel		Peru
Italy		Portugal
Japan		Romania
Korea		Russia
Macedonia		Taiwan
Malaysia		Thailand
Moldova		Trinidad & Tobago
Mongolia		Turkey
Netherlands		United States

PAID TV ADVERTISING

During the last past five decades, political advertising has become one of the dominant modes of electioneering in many countries. The power of reaching a large number of voters makes television advertising a popular method of campaign communication. Also, another merit of political advertising, unlike mediated or filtered

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messages in the news media, is that political parties or candidates can exert control over the content and formats of messages. In the United States, television commercials have been widely used during election campaigns and a substantial amount of campaign money is spent on them. The use of TV commercials for electioneering is also found in many other electoral democracies. Bowler and Farrell (2000) showed that out of thirty-two countries surveyed, twenty-one allow paid TV spots. Furthermore, Plasser and Plasser (2002) found that in the late 1990s, there were at least 50 democracies worldwide that allowed political parties or candidates to buy television air time. That is a large increase when compared to twenty years ago, when only four countries (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) permitted the purchase of air time by parties or candidates (Plasser and Plasser 2002, 206).[28]

As of the early 2000s, a large majority of countries allow the airing of paid television advertising. In the 74 countries studied in this analysis, 56 permit paid television advertising during election campaigns, while 18 countries do not.[29] In other words, 76 % of the countries surveyed permit airing paid political advertising on television.

Note, however, that access to paid TV advertising is highly related to a country's broadcasting system. With the dominance of public broadcasting, Western European countries have restricted the use of electoral advertising. Even after private broadcasters have been introduced, many countries still regulate political advertising or direct access for parties through purchase of airtime (Holtz-Bacha 2003).

Sieune (1995, 124) notes that:

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[28] Italy is considered as an exception to an opening up of political advertising to parties and candidates. After major political scandals, it reversed the opening up process and barred political advertising during the month before an election campaigns (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha 1995).

[29] Note that Denmark and Sweden are categorized as "no paid TV advertising countries", because paid political advertising is allowed only on local television stations (Plasser and Plasser 2002, Austin and Tjernström 2003)

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None of the public television channels in Scandinavia allow the purchase of political party advertising. Political advertising is generally perceived as a threat to the principles of democracy. It means that all parties have equal right to communicate to the electorate via the medium perceived as the most powerful. The opportunity for purchased political campaigns on television is widely seen as a challenge to the political balance in the Scandinavian multiparty systems.

Similarly, political parties in Germany can purchase advertising only on private channels. By law, broadcasters should charge lower than normal advertising rates (Drück 2004, 64).[30] Yet, political parties purchase within the limit of allocated airtime only on the private channels.

Table 4-3 Access to Paid TV Advertising

Access to Paid TV Ads (*n*=56)			Banning Paid TV Ads (*n*=18)
Albania	Greece	Paraguay	Armenia
Argentina	Guatemala	Peru	Belgium
Australia	Honduras	Philippines	Brazil
Austria	Hungary	Poland	Chile
Bolivia	Italy	Romania	France
Bulgaria	Jamaica	Russia	Ghana
Canada	Japan	Slovakia	India
Colombia	Korea	Slovenia	Ireland
Costa Rica	Latvia	Spain	Israel
Croatia	Lithuania	Sri Lanka	Mongolia
Cyprus (Greek)	Macedonia	Taiwan	Norway
Czech Republic	Malaysia	Thailand	Portugal
Dominican Republic	Mauritius	Trinidad & Tobago	South Africa
Ecuador	Mexico	Ukraine	Switzerland
El Salvador	Moldova	United States	Turkey
Estonia	Netherlands	Uruguay	United Kingdom
Finland	New Zealand	Venezuela	Denmark
Georgia	Nicaragua	Zambia	Sweden
Germany	Panama		

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[30] The conference of directors of the State Media Boards recommended a maximum of 35 % of the market rates, while private broadcasters assumed 55 % was appropriate.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS

Campaign finance laws constitute a critical legal framework not only for general electoral processes but also political communication between elites and masses. Money is critical for election campaigns, as it is a means for parties and candidates to purchase communication channels to reach the electorate. To persuade and activate citizens, campaigns need adequate funding.[31] Despite the pivotal role of political finance being widely appreciated, money in politics has been considered the dark side of democracy—corruption, special interest, and the like. In this regard, governments regulate political money to prevent problems that money might cause. First, campaign finance regulations seek to curve the role of money in politics. Campaign finance laws are to bend corruption or inadequate influence from special interests (Leonard 1991). The needs of political parties and candidates for money to fund election campaigns, combined with "greedy contributors" who want to influence the former, create concern about corruption, unfairness, and illegitimacy of the political process (Alexander and Shiratori 1994). In this regard, some campaign finance regulations are designed to block monetary inflow from inappropriate sources into politics--for example, corporate money. The second rationale for regulating political money is to level the playing field in the electoral process (i.e., equal access to political parties or candidates to compete in elections). Such legal measures aim to curtail the financial advantages of rich parties and equalize the incomes of competing parties and candidates, promoting equal participation and representation in government.

While diverse approaches to campaign finance regulations have been adopted, three broad options are available to policy makers: self-regulation, nonregulatory intervention (transparency measures), and regulatory measures (Ewing and Issacharoff

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[31] Previous studies, while focusing on legal frameworks of political finance, fall short of connecting its implication to the conduct of political communication. The literature gap may have arisen because of (1) the perception that campaign financing is an area where practitioners care about more than political scientists, (2) the lack of comparable, reliable data on comparative campaign finance, and (3) the definition ambiguity of *political finance* (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). The second reason, lack of reliable data, in particular, explains why a systematic study of comparative campaign finance systems is so rare.

2006). As of the early 2000s, almost all democratic societies have instituted legal requirements for political parties/candidates to file annual or postelection disclosure reports on revenues and expenditures. Few, however, rely solely on self-regulation or nonregulatory intervention, because it is unrealistic that the political actors would *voluntarily* "accept to be bound by a core set of values which place a premium on transparency, the avoidance of improper influence of dependence, and fair electoral competition" (Ewing and Issacharoff 2006, 2). Thus, it is common that regulatory measures are *imposed and enforced* on political parties and/or candidates (cf., Switzerland). According to Austin and Tjernström (2003: Table 1, 186-188), 71 countries (64 %) have a system of regulation for the financing of political parties and 40 countries (36 %) do not.[32] When political finance systems include regulations that focus mainly on candidates (not just political parties), the number of countries with a system of political finance increases to 89 (80 %).[33] In this sense, the use of regulatory measures for political funding has been widely accepted, whereas self-regulation and nonregulatory intervention seem to be out of favor. Moreover, as the role of money in elections becomes more pivotal— in other words, elections become more expensive— governments may well be up for devising complicated regulatory measures.[34]

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[32] Austin and Tjernström (2003) examine 111 countries, categorized as "free" or "partly free" in *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001–2002* (Freedom House).

[33] In fact, the exclusion of microcountries whose population sizes are less than one million makes it impossible to find a country without a political finance system.

[34] In comparison, the weakest measures of political finance regulations are found in Switzerland, New Zealand, Luxembourg, and Iceland where elections historically have been inexpensive and money has not played a significant role in politics.

Then how do governments regulate political money? Ewing and Issacharoff (2006: 3-4) divide regulatory options into the "supply side" and the "demand side."[35] The former targets the flow of money into political parties and candidates. This method aims not only to restrict the use of money from problematic sources but also to control the amount of political contributions. The demand-side option is directed to where and how much political parties and candidates spend political money.[36] This method basically aims to control "the need for unlimited sources of funding" by governing campaign expenditures and/or providing public funds (Ewing and Issacharoff 2006, 4).

Public finance was first legally adopted during the 1950s — Argentina in 1956 and Germany in 1959 (Alexander and Shiratori 1994). Since then, it has diffused into many other countries during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, public financing became one of the most popular campaign finance reforms in many democracies (Alexander and Shiratori 1994). Public financing is a proactive way of minimizing the inappropriate influence of money on officeholders by private entities while implementing the principles of equal participation and equal access to public office, rather than limiting campaign contributions and expenditures.

The implementation of public funding has arisen from different motivations across countries. Paltiel observes:

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[35] In the United States, the regulatory schemes focus mainly on the supply-side tools—campaign contributions. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended in 1974, instituted both contribution and expenditure limits for federal candidates. But *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976) made the expenditure limits void in violation of the First Amendment (free speech), while upholding the limitations on contributions. At the same time, the U.S. campaign finance laws also restrict political donations from business corporations and labor unions.

[36] The workings of expenditure limits vary across countries. The most common method is regulating overall expenditures during election campaigns. For example, in Britain, candidates face expenditure limits in proportion to population size in the electoral district.[36] Sometimes, legal regulations control campaign spending only in particular areas of campaign activities. For example, Spain puts a cap on the campaign budget for advertising spending, not on overall expenditures (Pinto-Duschinsky and Postnikov 1999).

The elimination of traditional sources of financial support, fiscal stringency, and campaign fund scandals either separately or in combination have been the factors triggering the introduction of public subventions of political parties and the obligation to disclose and publish party accounts of income and expenditure (1991, 26).

In Germany, for example, the primary motivation came from the desire of the more right-wing parties to become less dependent on their financial backers in private industry (Leonard 1991, 43). Austria imported a public finance system because of the reduction of party membership fees.[37] In Norway, generous public funding is provided to prevent seeking financial support from dubious sources (Grant 2006).

In general, public campaign finance takes two forms— direct and indirect funding. Direct public financing is provided in the form of monetary subsidies. Note, however, that the proportion of public financing out of the total party and campaign expenditure varies significantly from country to country. According to Karl-Heinz Nassmacher's estimates on the 13 countries, the percentage of public subsidies from total party expenditures ranges from 2 to 3 % (in the U.K. and the U.S. respectively) to 68 % (in Austria). The average is about a third of total expenditure on parties and campaigns (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002, 78).

Indirect public funding takes various forms such as tax exemptions, income tax benefits, use of state vehicles, office equipment, and state employees, for campaign activities. Most of all, providing free access to broadcasting airtime for political parties and/or candidates is one of the most common ways to subsidize campaign expenditures. For example, in Britain, major parties have access to party political broadcasts (PPBs) and party election broadcasts (PEBs) based on the number of candidates that a party has on the ballot at a general election (McNair 1995; Scammell and Semetko 1995). In

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[37] Mair and van Biezen (2001) show that during the 1980s and 1990s, political parties in the 20 European countries have suffered a significant loss in party membership. The membership-to- electorate ratio shows a greater decrease in old democracies than in newer ones. The largest drop was found in Austria. Between 1980 and 1998, the membership dropped by 446,209 and the membership-to-electorate ratio dropped about 11 %.

Austria, the provision of free TV was in force from 1967 to 2001 (Grant 2005). In France, political parties and candidates have been provided with equal access to broadcasts since the 1981 presidential election. The program order is determined by lot (Johnston and Gerstlé 1995), and thus the actual amount of time given to candidates varies depending upon the number of candidates in each race.[38]

The adoption of such legal stipulations, however, does not mean that they are enforced successfully. According to Plasser and Plasser (2002), campaign spending limits are either frequently circumvented in many countries (such as France, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), or not enforced in others (such as Colombia, Russia, and Ukraine). A study suggests that actual campaign expenditures in Korean elections might be more than double the disclosed amount (Park 1994).[39] In Russia, despite election laws requiring disclosure requirements and contribution limits, there is little indication that proper accounts have been submitted and published in recent years. Grant (2005) adequately notes that "problems with regard to the enforcement of the campaign and party finance regulations are due to the fact that the Control Committee consists of members of the Parliament, who are judge and judged at the same time." (55). Spending limits and campaign contribution bans as well as public financing, are often unproductive. Alexander and Shiratori (1994) hold that public financing is not effective in curbing influence of private donors or corruption (e.g., Italy).

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[38] The formats and content of the broadcasts are under strict regulation in France. For example, clips may not use the flag or the tricolors, show places where candidates performed their official duties, or use the national anthem on the soundtrack. Also, there are regulations concerning the production and financing of broadcasts.

[39] In Korean congressional elections, candidates most often ignore election laws regulating campaign money: nurturing district parties and other vote-gathering machines, and to providing services, food, spa trips, and other "goodies" for voters. New party entrants are often provided "gratitude fees" to reward them for higher participation. Large sums are expended to mobilize and convey voters to campaign speech rallies. As a last resort, cash is distributed in exchange for votes (Park 1994, 183).

Campaign Finance Laws in the early 2000s

        This study focuses on three aspects of campaign finance laws: (1) contribution/expenditure limits, (2) direct public funding, and (3) free access for broadcasting time. My most basic measures are simple classifications of those campaign finance regulations into binary indicator variables. More precisely, countries that set formal limits on the overall contribution amount in the early 2000s are coded as 1, whereas other countries are coded 0. The same measurement method is applied to the other two variables.

        Table 4-4 summarizes regulations concerning campaign contributions and expenditures of political parties/candidates in 74 countries. Most noticeably, supply (contribution)-side options for political finance laws are not widely used; contribution limits and bans on corporate and union donations are not as popular. Thirty-five percent of the countries prescribe how much an individual or a group can donate to a party, 24 percent ban corporate campaign donations to a party, and 11 percent set a ceiling on how much a party can raise.[40] In sum, 14 nations (including the United States) assume supply-side options. However, targeting the supply side seems to be out of favor for controlling political money in many countries.[41] In contrast, a demand-side option, campaign expenditure limits, is used by a relatively large number of countries. Forty-three percent of the countries examined in this analysis take aim at the specific amount of money spent during elections. Brazil and Mexico have the most restrictive campaign finance laws in terms of contribution and spending limits, where all four aspects of laws concerning campaign contributions and expenditures are controlled by the government. In contrast,

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[40] In Mexico, parties are not permitted an amount of private funding that equals or exceeds their amount of public funding.

[41] According to data presented in Austin and Tjernström (2003), among all the free and party-free nations, 30 countries (27 %) have a ceiling on a donor's contribution. An even smaller number, 9, set a ceiling on total contributions that a party can raise (8 %). In regulating types of donation, 22 countries (20 %) impose a ban on corporate donations and 17 countries (15 %) ban trade-union donations to political parties, respectively.

Table 4-4 Campaign Contribution and Expenditure Limits

Limits for a donor	Ban on corporate donation[1]	Overall contribution limits	Spending limits
35% (*n*=26)	24% (*n*=18)	11% (*n*=8)	43% (*n*=32)
Argentina	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina
Armenia	Armenia	Bulgaria	Armenia
Belgium	Belgium	Ecuador	Belgium
Bolivia	Bolivia	Georgia	Brazil
Brazil	Brazil	Mexico	Bulgaria
Bulgaria	Dominican Republic	Moldova	Canada
Costa Rica	Estonia	Portugal	Colombia
Ecuador	France	Romania	Ecuador
Estonia	Greece		France
France	Honduras		Greece
Greece	Israel		Hungary
Ireland	South Korea		India
Israel	Mexico		Israel
Italy	Paraguay		Italy
Japan	Poland		Japan
South Korea	Portugal		South Korea
Latvia	Romania		Lithuania
Lithuania	United States		Macedonia
Mexico			Mauritius
Poland			Mexico
Portugal			New Zealand
Romania			Philippines
Russia			Poland
Spain			Russia
Ukraine			Slovakia
United States			Slovenia
			Spain
			Taiwan
			Thailand
			Tonga
			Ukraine
			United Kingdom

[1] Czech Republic bans donations from state corporations (Austin and Tjernström 2003, 200).

Mongolia, Croatia, Australia, Chile, Zambia, Uruguay, and South Africa maintain the most liberal campaign finance laws.[42]

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[42] Why do some governments intervene in the way political parties raise and spend campaign funds more than others? Ewing and Issacharoff (2006) suggest that campaign

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Having examined the patterns of political finance laws regulating the amount of campaign contributions and expenditures, I turn to public financing systems. Table 4-5 contains data on the provisions, purposes, and allocation methods of public finance in 74 democracies. The pervasiveness of public financing across democracies is striking: About 70 % of the countries (*n*=52) provide direct public funding and 83% (*n*=62) allow access to free broadcast time for political parties and/or candidates. As Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) notes, very poor or very small countries fail to provide public financing (i.e., Cyprus (Greek), Jamaica, Jordan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia). Three countries (Switzerland, Venezuela, and the United States) are exceptions, in terms of their levels of economic and political development.[43] In addition, approach to public finance also indicates some regional patterns. Because political parties are more important in Europe than North America, public financing systems in European countries emphasize support for permanent party organization rather than individual candidacies, as in North American countries (Leonard 1991, 42).

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financing cannot be understood independent of "the constitutional conventions of the country, the nature of the political parties in the country, and the means of access to publication and the media in any given nation" (2). Unfortunately, this dissertation cannot provide a complete answer to what drives cross-national differences in campaign finance laws.

[43] Incidentally, the United States and Switzerland are known to have the lowest turnout rates among the advanced democracies (Jackman 1987).

Table 4-5 Public Funding for Political Parties in 74 countries

Public direct funding[1]	Yes	70% (52 countries)
	No	28% (22 countries)
Purpose	For both general and electoral expenditures	48% (25 countries)
	Non-earmarked	29% (15 countries)
	Electoral purposes only	17% (9 countries)
	General party expenditure only	6% (3 countries)
Basis for funding	Performance in both the previous and current elections	15% (8 countries)
	Performance in the current election only	17% (9 countries)
	Current representation in parliament or Performance in previous elections only	48% (25 countries)
	Equal distribution + performance	15% (8 countries)
	Equal allocation	4% (2 countries)
Free TV time[2]	Yes	83% (62 countries)
	No	17% (12 countries)

1.In Mongolia, public funding is weak, thus, campaign finance depends mainly on private source.
2. In Australia, public broadcasting channels provide free time to parties based on internal policies. In Austria, the allocation of free TV time was effective only during 1967-2001. In Greece, free television time was provided since 2002, but it was not well implemented.

DISCUSSION

       The overview of the political communication systems in 74 countries clearly demonstrates that countries adopt diverse institutional arrangements in regulating mass media and campaign communications. A large majority of the countries have mixed broadcasting systems -- the average size of public broadcasting audience is 44 percent. Thus, the commercialization of broadcasting seems to have developed to substantial levels. By contrast, the press system still remains partisan or political in terms of its content or organizational affiliations with major political groups, such as political parties, politicians, or labor unions. In the case of paid political advertising on television, the use of paid ads is widespread in democratic elections. Seventy-six percent of the countries in my study guarantee access to paid television advertising. In terms of campaign finance laws, limiting the inflow and outflow of campaign funds is not widely adopted. While spending limits are implemented in about 43% of the countries, different measures of

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contribution limits are found in a smaller number of countries. By contrast, public finance is widely used. Seventy percent of the countries (n=52) provide direct public funding, and 83 % (n=62) allow access to free broadcast time for political parties and/or candidates.

Chapter 5: The Effects of Political Communication Systems on Voter Turnout

Chapter 4 has presented the landscape of political communication systems in 74 democracies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this chapter, I show that different arrangements of media systems, political television advertising, and campaign finance systems, are important factors to explain the cross-national differences in citizen political behavior— in particular, voter participation. In what follows, I revisit my theory and then present my data and analyses. Finally, I discuss my findings and their implications.

In general, the empirical findings support the broader argument for institutional effects. First, campaign finance systems that allow more money and electioneering communications to enter election campaigns are associated with higher levels of voter turnout. Second, broadcasting systems and access to paid television advertising explain cross-national variation in turnout; however, their effects are more complex than initially expected. While public broadcasting clearly promotes higher levels of turnout, it also modifies the effect of paid advertising access on turnout.

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Throughout this chapter, the unit of analysis is individual countries. To ensure that campaign communication is meaningful, nations qualified for this study based on two criteria. First, they need to be electoral democracies that guarantee at least partly free competition among different political parties. In this regard, countries were selected that had been categorized as "free" and "partly free" by Freedom House from 1995 and 2002, excluding nations with populations of less than one million.[44] Second, a minimum level of media penetration was required. Each country should have developed a certain level of broadcasting infrastructure and a substantial number of television viewers to be able to

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[44] Among nations categorized as "partly free" by Freedom House, seven countries (Kuwait, Bangladesh, Singapore, Gabon, Tonga, Jordan, and Morocco) were excluded from the sampling frame because their elections are not sufficiently free.

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estimate the effects of its political communication system. Fifteen countries could not meet the second criterion because their number of television viewers was too small (i.e., the number of television sets per 1,000 households was less than 50).[45] As a result, 74 countries were included in the final analysis.

A remaining issue is whether these countries are comparable, particularly because public broadcasting in nonliberal and liberal democracies might differ. In less democratic societies, state ownership of the media often signifies state control of the media. However, public broadcasting channels in advanced democracies, while independent from state control, provide programs that aim to satisfy the diverse needs of the society. Thus, this study also presents a subsample analyses of countries that meet higher standards when rated in terms of democracy and broadcasting market development (i.e., Polity IV score no less than 8 and television sets no less than 200).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable is the average turnout rates in legislative elections between 1995 and 2004. My turnout measure is the percentage of the voting-age population who cast a vote (Jackman 1987; Powell 1996).[46] The average turnout rate is

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[45]   These countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. Even though many are African nations, they are not excluded for that reason. Four African countries that meet the selection criteria are present in the sample: Ghana, Mauritius South Africa, and Zambia.

[46] Some previous studies measure turnout by the percentage of the registered population who cast a ballot (e.g., Crewe 1981; Franklin 1996; Blais and Dobrzynska. 1998). The voting-age population measure runs the risk of underestimating actual turnout rates because the number of the voting-age population might include noneligible voters such as noncitizens. In contrast, the other tends to overestimate turnout, particularly of the undeveloped or the countries with a strict registration requirement (e.g., the United States). In my sample, the risk of overestimating turnout by using the registered voters as a denominator seems significantly higher than the alternative, because it includes many undeveloped countries. Thus, I select turnout based on the voting-age population (see footnote 20).

Figure 5-1 Average Voter Turnout in 74 Countries Between 1995 and 2004

66 percent, and the standard deviation is 14. These numbers indicate that there is a great deal of variation in voter turnout in the sample.[47] Although there are different types of political participation, the interest in this analysis is voter participation in national elections. For many citizens, voting in elections is the most common (or the only) form of political participation. Moreover, voter turnout data are relatively reliable and accessible for cross-national comparison purposes.

MEASURING COMMUNICATION SYSTEM VARIABLES[48]

Three political communication variables represent a country's media system characteristics. In examining broadcasting systems, I employ two different measures. The first involves categorical dummy variables (public/state, mixed, and private systems) and the other uses public broadcasting audience share, which measures total audience share of public television channels out of the aggregate market share of the five largest television stations in a given country. I compiled this measure using data from Djankov et al. (2003) and Eurodata/Mediametrie (2003).[49] Public broadcasting audience shares range from 0 percent to 100 percent with a mean of 44 percent and a standard deviation of 32. The development of mass press or newspaper penetration is measured by daily newspaper subscribers per 1,000 people. Politicization of the press is measured by a dichotomous variable: 1 represents a high level of partisan press and 0 is used for others. Two criteria were used to determine if a partisan press is present in the country: (1) media content and (2) organizational affiliation. If major daily newspapers in the countries either exhibit distinct partisan orientations in news reporting or are affiliated with (or owned by) the

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[47] Table A-1 in the Appendix reports election years used for calculating the average turnout of individual countries.

[48] Table A-2 in the Appendix summarizes variable descriptions and data sources.

[49] I followed the coding schemes of Djankov et al. (2003) in compiling public broadcasting audience share. When I compared regression results of the models using Djankov et al. (2003)'s audience share data with those using mine (correlations = 0.86), two measures produced the same substantive findings about the effect of broadcasting systems (and their interaction effect with access to paid advertising).

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government, political parties, or major social groups, they were coded as constituting a partisan press. I concentrate on the press system because political parallelism is generally more manifest in and variant across press systems than broadcasting systems (Van Kempen 2007; Patterson and Donsbach 1996). I constructed this variable by analyzing diverse literature on the world's press.[50]

Access to paid television advertising is measured by a dummy variable: 1 for countries that allow paid political television advertising and 0 for countries that ban television advertising (see Table A-1 in Appendix). In the analysis, 76 percent of countries allow parties and/or candidates to purchase paid television advertising during election campaigns.   In the interaction effect models, I also include the interaction terms between the broadcasting system variables and access to paid TV advertising. These interaction terms serve to illustrate how a country's broadcasting system modifies the effect of access to paid television advertising on voter turnout.

Finally, three dichotomous variables measure the characteristics of campaign finance laws across countries: (1) campaign contribution and spending limits—1 for countries with legal regulations on the overall amount of either campaign contributions or expenditures or both, and 0 for others, (2) public direct funding—1 for countries that provide public direct funding for electioneering purposes and 0 for others, and (3) free television access for parties and/or candidates—1 for countries offering free TV time and 0 for others.

Forty- five percent of countries in the sample have campaign contribution and/or spending limits of some sort. Furthermore, a large majority of countries provide public funding to political parties and/or candidates for electioneering purposes. About 72

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[50] Van Kempen (2007) measures media-party parallelism (both press-party and broadcasting-party parallelisms) using survey respondents' partisanship and media usage. Her media-party parallelism scores indicate cross-national variations among the West European countries. Because of lack of suitable survey data, this analysis takes Hallin and Mancini (2004)'s qualitative approach to measuring this variable. For a full list of description of each country's press system, please contact the author.

percent of countries offered public direct funding and about 83 percent provided free television access to political parties and/or candidates (see Table A-1 in Appendix).

METHOD

To estimate the effects of political communication systems on voter turnout, ordinary least squares regression are used with robust standard errors. Because the regression models employ aggregate-level data —whereas true behavioral models for voter participation need to be individualistic— they might exhibit heteroscedasticity. In theory, the country-level model will be heteroscedastic with an error variance inversely proportional to the country's population; diagnostic tests, however, did not detect a significant heteroscedasticity problem.[51] Even though heteroscedasticity is not a significant problem in the data, the regression models were estimated with robust standard errors. For a small sample analysis, robust regression produces estimators that are not unduly affected by small departures from model assumptions, such as heteroscedasticity or outliers (Western 1995).[52]

BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

Before investigating the causality between political communication system variables and voter turnout with regression analyses, I look at binary relationships between each of key explanatory variables and voter turnout.

Broadcasting systems   Table 5-1 shows the turnout differences among countries with different types of broadcasting systems. The averages of turnout for the state/public, mixed, and private systems are 65 %, 68 %, and 64 %, respectively. Private systems have

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[51] The Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity, using fitted values of voter turnout, produced a chi-square of 0.13, which was not significant (p=0.72).

[52] In the time frame of this study, only two incidents of change in the key independent variables were noticed. Italy banned paid television advertising after the 1996 general election. Austria abandoned free access to television time to political parties in 2002. For these two countries, the model excluded elections that occurred after regulatory changes (see Table A-1 in Appendix). Mostly static independent variables led me to employ OLS regression rather than pooled time series analysis.

the lowest average turnout rate, while mixed systems the highest. These bivariate results suggest that lower turnout rates are found among countries with dominantly private systems, while turnout difference between State/public and mixed systems are not significant.

Table 5-1 Three Broadcasting Systems and Average Voter Turnout

	N	Mean turnout	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
State/public systems	12	64.87	15.66	35.95	83.55
Mixed systems	38	67.63	11.82	39.25	89
Private system	24	63.38	16.66	33.15	94

Figure 5-2 Public Broadcasting Audience Share and Voter Turnout

In Figure 5-2, similar trends are found in the relationship between public broadcasting audience share and turnout. Higher degrees of public audience share are associated with higher levels of voter turnout. Levels of public broadcasting audience share and turnout are positively correlated, but statistically insignificant. Note, however, that some of high turnout countries with lowest levels of public broadcasting audience share – Turkey, Australia, Brazil, and Cyprus– adopt compulsory voting and that Switzerland and Zambia have exceptionally low turnout rates. Taking these outlier countries into account, we observe a clear and positive relationship.

Newspaper readership The binary relationship between the number of newspaper subscribers in the country and turnout shows no distinct pattern. What is striking in Figure 5-3 is that the number of newspaper subscribers per 1000 in most of the countries are less than 200 and those countries have a wide range of turnout rates regardless of different levels of newspaper readership. On the other hand, countries with the newspaper subscribers larger than 200 generally enjoy moderately high levels of voter turnout except for Switzerland.

Figure 5- 3 Newspaper Readership and Turnout

Partisan press   As expected, the comparison between political press systems and non-political press systems (see Table 5-2) shows that countries that developed press systems that are explicitly partisan in content or/and affiliated with major political actors have a higher level of turnout than nonpartisan counter parts. The average turnout for partisan press systems is 67 % and that for nonpartisan press systems is 64 %. This difference is statistically insignificant, however ($p = 0.18$).

Table 5-2 Partisan Press and Turnout

	N	**Mean turnout**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Partisan press	46	66.97	14.80	35.93	94
Non-partisan press	28	63.9	12.92	33.15	82.4

Access to Paid Television Advertising   As shown in Table 5-3, access to television advertising seems to be negatively associated with voter turnout. The average turnout for countries with no access to television ads is 6 points higher than those with access to them. The difference, however, is not statistically meaningful.

Table 5-3 Access to Television Advertising and Voter Turnout

	N	**Mean turnout**	**SD**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Allowing paid TV ads	56	64.61	14.40	33.15	94
Banning paid TV ads	18	69.53	12.84	35.93	85.13

Campaign finance laws The *t*-test estimation for spending limits finds no significant difference in turnout means between the countries. Yet the binary relationship between public financing measures and turnout estimated by the independent group *t*-tests shows a positive association. Countries with legal measures that provide public campaign financing to political parties and/or candidates tend to have a substantially higher turnout than do their counterparts without them. The countries that provide public

direct funding enjoy a 9 percent higher turnout than do their counterparts. On the other hand, countries with access to free TV time have about 10 percent higher turnout rate on average than those without it.

Table 5-4 Campaign Finance Laws and Average Voter Turnout

	N	Mean turnout	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Campaign funding limits					
Funding limits	34	65.86	12.06	39.25	89
No funding limits	40	65.76	15.80	33.15	94
Public direct funding					
Public direct funding	53	68.18	13.84	33.15	94
No direct funding	21	59.18	13.28	35.93	78.35
Free TV time					
Free TV time	62	67.34	13.34	33.15	94
No Free TV time	12	57.87	15.88	35.93	78.1

These bivariate correlations may be useful in providing preliminary evidence regarding the relationship between variables. However, their estimates do not provide information about causality. Moreover, because the simple bivariate correlation estimation does not control for other case characteristics, the validity of the estimation might be questionable, especially when the sample includes cases of large diversity. In this regard, multivariate regression analyses yield superior estimates of the causal effects of media variables on turnout.

THE BASELINE MODEL

As seen in Table 5-5, Model 1 demonstrates the base model of voter turnout. It includes a set of socioeconomic and political institution variables that previous comparative turnout studies have found important. To control for socioeconomic

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development, the model includes a Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite index combining an educational component (adult literacy rates and gross enrollment ratios for schooling), a wealth component (gross domestic product per capita), and life expectancy (UNDP 2000).[53] As voter turnout also depends on how political institutions and electoral systems are structured, the base model includes political-institutional factors: (1) compulsory voting, (2) structure of parliament (unicameralism), (3) nature of representative allocation (district magnitude), and (4) degrees of democracy. Lastly, the model includes a variable representing each country's degree of government involvement in the economy, measured by the percentage of socially owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in the nation. SOEs control for government engagement in the overall economy, without which the estimates of the effects of broadcasting system and public finance laws could be inaccurate indicators of the state's general role in the economy (Djankov et al. 2003).

Regression results for the base model are consistent with the theories and empirical findings of existing comparative turnout studies. The measure of socioeconomic development (HDI) is associated with higher levels of citizen participation. Recall that the socioeconomic status model of political participation and the social mobilization theory predict that socioeconomic development fosters voter turnout. Countries with compulsory voting have higher turnout rates than those without it (by 14.7 percent). Average district magnitudes also have a significant impact, as larger districts yield higher voter participation. This result is consistent with existing findings by scholars such as Powell (1986), Jackman (1987), and Franklin (1996). The positive and significant impact of the Polity variable suggests that higher degrees of democracy indicate more decisive election outcomes, thus increasing voters' incentive to go to the polls (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Unicameralism and socially owned enterprises,

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[53] A composite index to measure a country's socioeconomic development has an advantage because different indices like GDP per capita, literacy rates, and educational attainment usually have substantially high correlations. By using a composite index, the model avoids the large collinearity between independent variables and allows more degrees of freedom.

however, do not produce statistically meaningful results, even though the estimated effects followed the expectations of this study. Overall, the base model explains 30 percent of the variance in cross-national differences in voter turnout.[54]

THE ADDITIVE EFFECT MODELS

Models 2, 3, and 4 (in Table 5-5) report regression results for different specifications of political communication system models of voter turnout. Model 2 uses categorical variables for measuring broadcasting systems, while Model 3 uses public broadcasting audience shares. Model 4 is a subgroup analysis of Model 3 that includes only countries with (1) Polity IV scores equal to or higher than 8 and (2) estimated television set totals higher than 200. Overall, the political communication system models of voter turnout explain a large proportion of variance in voter turnout in legislative elections in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For example, with Model 2, the level of variance explained is 47 percent. Put another way, by including the political communication system variables, the model gains an additional 57 percent in the level of variance explained in comparison with the base model.

In general, the empirical findings in this study support the mobilization hypothesis about the effects of campaign finance variables. Free television access is associated with substantially higher turnout rates, with an average effect ranging from 9 to 15 percentage points. Public direct funding also has a positive effect. It has an especially large and statistically significant impact among advanced democracies (Model 4). Legal regulations on campaign contributions and expenditures have a negative effect on voter turnout, although the coefficient is only significant in Model 2. Because free access to television

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[54] The base model is parsimonious, but comprehensive enough to include most of the variables that previous comparative turnout studies have found significant. The model specification tests show no significant omitted variables. Furthermore, the R-squared of the base model is comparable with that of existing studies, considering that this study (1) includes a larger number of heterogeneous countries than many existing studies have included (e.g., Powell 1986, N=17; Jackman and Miller 1995, N=22) and (2) does not contain country/region dummy variables. If the base model includes only advanced democracies and country dummy variables for the United States and Switzerland, the R-squared is increased to 0.80.

time taps campaign information more directly than the other campaign finance variables, the estimation seems to predict its effect more clearly.

Newspaper subscription fails to explain differences in voter turnout. It seems that a large correlation between newspaper subscriptions and the measure of socioeconomic development (HDI) cause its parameters to have an unexpected (though insignificant) sign. Similarly, HDI does not have a significant impact on turnout, once newspaper subscription is included in the models.[55]

A partisan press also has an insignificant effect on turnout in all three models. In comparing this result with the significant findings of Van Kempen (2007), two things need to be noted. While Van Kempen (2007) focuses on West European countries, the sample in this study includes many less democratic nations. The effect of a partisan press might influence those countries differently. In advanced democracies, a partisan press indicates stronger party systems and pluralistic press systems. For less democratic countries, a partisan press probably indicates the opposite. Another reason might be the crudeness of this model's measure of partisan press. While the scale of Van Kempen (2007) distinguishes the highest level of media-party parallelism in Greece from the lowest in Germany, the dummy variable in this analysis cannot capture such differences.

In the case of broadcasting systems, regression results indicate a highly positive effect of having public broadcasting systems on voter turnout. State/public systems have the highest turnout level, and private systems have the lowest. In Model 2, the average turnout rate of private systems is significantly lower than that of state/public and mixed systems—by 13 percent ($p=0.01$) and 11 percent ($p=0.02$), respectively. However, voter turnout differences between state/public and mixed systems are not significant ($p=0.5$). When measuring broadcasting system by public audience share, these findings are replicated. A 1 percent increase in public audience share accompanies a 0.15-percent

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[55] In a pilot study, a variable estimating the effect of Internet penetration on turnout found the same problem. The Pearson correlation between newspaper subscription and HDI is 0.61 and that for Internet penetration and HDI is 0.71.

Table 5-5. Political Communication System Model of Voter Turnout: Additive Models

Dependent Variable: Turnout	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Degree of democracy	1.51*	2.34***	1.92**	3.10
	(0.84)	(0.80)	(0.77)	(2.54)
Compulsory voting	14.70***	21.88***	20.19***	20.20***
	(3.24)	(4.22)	(3.46)	(3.36)
District magnitude	0.07***	0.04	0.06**	0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unicameralism	3.48	4.81*	5.37**	4.83
	(2.81)	(2.76)	(2.63)	(3.43)
HDI	0.29*	0.20	0.25	-0.04
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.33)
Socially owned enterprises (%)	0.18	0.21	0.16	0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Free TV time		9.06*	14.77***	12.51*
		(4.61)	(4.36)	(7.11)
Campaign funding limits		-5.26**	-3.47	-2.95
		(2.59)	(2.49)	(2.78)
Public direct funding		2.31	2.44	12.55***
		(3.27)	(2.91)	(2.77)
Number of newspaper subscribers		-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisan press		2.01	0.51	0.45
		(2.87)	(2.87)	(3.23)
Access to paid TV advertising		2.61	1.22	0.59
		(3.16)	(2.86)	(3.09)
Mixed broadcasting system		-2.82		
		(4.28)		
Private broadcasting system		-13.12**		
		(5.07)		
Public audience share			0.15***	0.21***
			(0.05)	(0.07)
Constant	19.42	14.70	-1.60	7.40
	(12.66)	(15.57)	(16.98)	(28.97)
R^2	0.30	0.47	0.57	0.67
Adjusted R^2	0.24	0.35	0.46	0.49
Number of observations	74	74	66	37

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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increase in voter turnout. An even stronger effect is found among advanced democracies. Model 4 shows that the marginal effect of public audience share is 0.2 percent. The turnout difference between pure private and pure pubic systems is 15 percent for the whole sample and 20 percent for advanced democracies, holding other factors constant. The positive effect of public broadcasting is clear and consistent across the different models in Table 5-5.

Access to paid television advertising also shows a positive relationship with turnout. The regression coefficients, however, fall short of being statistically significant. The additive effect models assume that the influence of access to television advertising should be the same across different levels of other independent variables. As discussed earlier, the model predicts that this effect depends on a country's type of broadcasting system. In the following section, I will discuss the results of the interaction models.

THE INTERACTION EFFECT MODELS

Table 5-6 reports regression results of the interaction models that include multiplicative terms between access to paid advertising and broadcasting systems. Comparisons of regression results between the corresponding additive and interaction equations indicate that most of the coefficient estimates in Table 5-6 retain the direction and significance levels reported in Table 5-5. The only notable difference is that the effects of campaign funding limits and free television time are consistently more significant in the interaction models.

While the additive models do not find paid advertising to have a significant impact, the interaction models suggest that this effect depends on broadcasting systems. In Model 5, the coefficient on the constitutive term for television advertising access (β=14.34) indicates that access to paid advertising has a significant impact in public/state broadcasting systems (p=0.09). Allowing paid television advertising does not significantly affect voter turnout in either private (marginal effect = -7.7, p=0.11) or mixed systems (marginal effect=1.46, p=0.68), however. The estimated results of Model 5 are inconclusive with respect to whether interaction effects add much; in fact, the *F*-test

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Table 5-6 Political Communication System Model of Voter Turnout: Interaction Models

Dependent Variable: Turnout	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Degree of democracy	2.91***	2.49***	4.27*
	(0.85)	(0.78)	(2.11)
Compulsory voting	20.13***	18.99***	18.48***
	(4.25)	(3.43)	(3.46)
District magnitude	0.03	0.05*	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unicameralism	4.39*	4.31*	5.08
	(2.59)	(2.60)	(3.45)
HDI	0.17	0.21	0.57
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.33)
Socially owned enterprises (%)	0.20	0.16	0.05
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Free TV time	9.54**	14.47***	11.43**
	(4.38)	(3.82)	(4.91)
Campaign funding limits	-6.41**	-5.06**	-6.70*
	(2.63)	(2.43)	(3.59)
Public direct funding	1.67	1.04	9.74**
	(3.29)	(2.86)	(3.47)
Number of newspaper subscribers	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisan press	2.89	1.21	1.68
	(2.93)	(2.87)	(3.15)
Access to paid TV advertising	14.38*	-12.27**	-18.29**
	(7.78)	(5.50)	(7.58)
Mixed broadcasting system	4.80		
	(7.60)		
Private broadcasting system	3.48		
	(7.69)		
Access to TV advertising× Mixed broadcasting system	-12.92		
	(8.58)		
Access to TV advertising × Private broadcasting system	-22.13**		
	(8.72)		
Public audience share		-0.08	-0.11
		(0.98)	(0.16)
Access to TV advertising × Public audience share		0.28***	0.39**
		(0.11)	(0.18)
Constant	6.22	10.97	8.15
	(17.51)	(16.43)	(24.51)
R^2	0.50	0.62	0.73
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.51	0.56
Number of observations	74	66	37

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$

shows that adding the interactive terms does not significantly improve the fit of the model.

By comparison, the *F*-tests for Models 6 and 7 indicate the interaction models are significantly better than their corresponding additive models in explaining voter turnout.[56] By using categorical dummy variables that measure broadcasting systems, Model 5 permits more observations; yet audience share data are sure to measure a country's broadcasting system more precisely. More to the point, the estimates of Models 6 and 7 display a clearer pattern of positive interaction effects between access to paid advertising and public broadcasting. According to Models 6 and 7, when the public broadcasting audience share is equal to zero, the marginal effect of paid advertising access is -12.27 for the whole sample and -18.29 for advanced democracies. Table 5-6, of course, provides limited information about the size and significance of marginal effects at varying levels of public broadcasting audience share. Thus, I calculated access to paid advertising's marginal effect and standard errors on voter turnout at different levels of public broadcasting audience share.

Figure 5-4 displays the marginal effect of paid advertising access as levels of public broadcasting audience share change. The solid sloping line denotes the marginal effect and dashed lines indicate a 95-percent confidence interval based on the estimates of the Model 6 and Model 7 estimates, respectively.[57] When both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are located above or below the zero line, the marginal effect is statistically significant. The significant effect is found at the highest levels of public broadcasting audience (60 percent and higher) and at the lowest levels of public broadcasting audience (less than 25 percent). In public broadcasting systems, countries that permit paid television advertising for electioneering have higher rates of voter

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[56] Model 5: *F*-value = 1.59, $p=0.2$; Model 6: *F*-value = 5.73, $p=0.02$; Model 7: *F*-value = 5.11 and $p=0.03$.

[57] Graphs in Figure 5-4 were created with the software Stata™ using computer code written by Brambor, Clark, and Golder. [see http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html#code].

turnout than those that ban paid advertising. The opposite relationship holds forth in private broadcasting systems. The subsample analysis of advanced democracies also confirms the existence of such interaction effects. Access to paid advertising has a negative marginal effect in private-dominant broadcasting systems and a positive effect in public-dominant broadcasting systems. In mixed broadcasting systems, access to paid advertising does not create significant differences in voter turnout.

Of the twenty-three countries that have public audience shares of less than 25 percent, a majority are Latin American. To test if such nations were a confounding factor, models were run that included a regional dummy variable for Latin America. Results of these models indicate that the dummy variable for Latin America neither changes the regression results nor produces a statistically significant effect on voter turnout. Thus, the negative interaction between access to paid advertising and private broadcasting systems is not due to the uniqueness of Latin American countries. One might also suspect that the interaction effect is largely driven by either pure private systems or pure public systems. In testing this possibility, I estimated the interaction model, excluding cases where the public broadcasting audience share is either 0 or 100. These estimates produce the same interaction effect, with the interaction term being statistically significant at the $p=0.06$ level (results not shown in Table 5-6).

The interaction models have demonstrated that the effect of access to paid advertising on voter turnout depends on the structure of the broadcasting market. In public systems, the allowance of paid advertising on television is associated with higher voter turnout. Political advertising in public broadcasting systems may have an even greater tendency to activate voters due to its rareness and stylistic distinction when compared to regularly recurring programs on public television. In other words, voters are less desensitized to political commercials— which can be quite striking — than to programs or commercials they see on a regular basis. On the other hand, the negative marginal effect of access to paid advertising in highly private systems suggests that the commercialization of political communication —and thus media-centered campaigns— are related to lower voter turnout. This finding parallels the observation of Rosenstone

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and Hansen (1993) that citizens are less likely to vote when the main approach to promoting a candidate or party is based on mass media rather than person-to-person mobilization.

Because of the symmetric nature of multiplicative interaction models, the effect of broadcasting systems is also modified by access to paid advertising (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). In Model 5, the coefficients for private systems and mixed systems represent their marginal effects when paid television ads are banned. Neither coefficient is significant. In other words, among countries without access to paid advertising, broadcastings systems do not produce significant differences in voter turnout. For those that allow political advertising, the marginal effect for private systems is -18.7 with p=0.03, and that for mixed broadcasting systems is -8.12 with p=0.21. Once again, significant differences in voter turnout are found between state/public and private systems only when paid advertising is available. Models 6 and 7 show similar results. When paid advertising is allowed, public broadcasting audience share has a positive marginal effect of 0.2 (-0.08+0.28) for the whole sample, and 0.28 (-0.11+0.39) for advanced democracies. Given that about 75 percent of the countries in the sample allow paid advertising, a significant effect of public broadcasting is found in a large majority of electoral democracies.[58]

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[58] When the registered population is used to measure voter turnout, the overall results do not change. However, there are a few differences to note. Cross-national differences in degrees of democracy and socioeconomic development lose their explanatory power. The interactive effect of access to television ads and broadcasting systems is not significant in the analysis using the whole sample. When only advanced countries are examined, estimates do not change. This finding is due to the fact that the registration population measure of voter turnout tends to overestimate turnout of undeveloped countries, thus reducing cross-national turnout variances.

Figure 5-4 Marginal Effect of Access to Paid Ads

(1) Whole Sample (Model 6)

2) Advanced Democracies (Model 7)

(3) Whole Sample (excluding Switzerland)

(4) Advanced Democracies (excluding Switzerland)

ROBUSTNESS CHECK

Regression estimates can be distorted by a single observation (or small group of observations) especially for small-sample analyses like the one in this study. Various outlier and leverage tests applied to the data (e.g., DFFIT, Cook's Distance, Leverage, and DFBETA) indicate that Switzerland is an influential outlier.   In particular, Switzerland's large DFBETA values for access to television advertising and broadcasting systems seemed potentially problematic. When Switzerland is excluded from the estimation, however, results do not change for estimates in Tables 5-5 and 5-6. In fact, the only difference is with the Model 7 estimates, where the interaction term loses significance at the highest level of public audience share (see graphs (3) and (4) in Figure 5-4). Because of Model 7's small number of observations, it is more sensitive to an influential outlier than Models 5 and 6. In general, however, the regression estimates are robust enough that outliers do not change the key substantive findings.

COLLINEARITY

Because the turnout models include different independent variables of political and communication institutions, multicollinearity might be present in the data. In the additive models, some independent variables have significant correlations with other independent variables in the models, however multicollinearity indicate no serious problems. For instance, a higher level of socioeconomic (HDI) and political development (Polity IV) comes with a greater chance of using public finance for election campaigns. Generally, however, the binary correlations are small between the independent variables and the tolerance tests (1/variance inflation factor) do not suggest any serious problems. The condition index of the global instability of regression coefficients show some signs of a moderate level of instability between polity, HDI, and newspaper readership. Their correlations, however, are far from being perfectly collinear (about ρ=0.60). Furthermore, because multicollinearity affects only related variables, the estimates of political communication variables will not be affected. As expected, the multiplicative terms and

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the constitutive terms have large correlations in the interaction models. Model 5 has a high level of collinearity between the constitutive and interaction terms involving private systems (1/variance inflation factor = 0.07), while Models 6 and 7 show a lesser degree of multicollinearity (1/variance inflation factor = 0.11). In the presence of multicollinearity, some suggest eliminating the constitutive terms from interaction models. However, recent studies show that omitting the constitutive terms can result in estimation errors that are more problematic than multicollinearity, and that multicollinearity in interaction models should be handled differently than in additive models.[59]

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE U.S. AND VOTER TURNOUT: POST-TEST SIMULATIONS

In chapter 3, I discussed the uniqueness of U.S. media systems and campaign finance laws, suggesting that might be a critical variable omitted in the existing turnout literature to explain low turnout in the United States. The empirical results in this chapter actually suggest that some characteristics of U.S. media systems and campaign finance laws might be attributed to its low turnout rates. To show how (and how much) U.S. communication systems are associated with the turnout rates in that country, I conducted a series of post-test simulation analyses based on the empirical results reported in Model 6, shown in Table 5-6. The estimates demonstrate how the change in one element of communication systems affects the predicted turnout in U.S. elections, holding other factors constant.

Figure 5-5 shows that the implementation of campaign funding limits would have decreased turnout by 5 percent from the predicted value of U.S. turnout – 44 percent. By contrast, the low turnout in U.S. elections seems mainly due to the lack of public broadcasting and free TV access. The simulation estimates show that, if the U.S. broadcasting system becomes a mixed system (i.e. public broadcasting audience share =

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[59] For a detailed discussion about multicollinearity in interaction models, see Brambor et al. (2006).

50 %), turnout is expected to increase by 12 percent. Similarly, free access to TV time for political parties and/candidates during elections should boost turnout by 14 percent. In addition, banning paid TV advertising would increase turnout as much as 8 percent, holding other factors (including the broadcasting system constant).

In sum, U.S. turnout might increase significantly if we were to see the introduction of public service channels and free TV time access in congressional elections. On the other hand, public direct financing is not a critical factor for turnout, as many critics worry. The introduction of public direct funding might increase turnout by 1 %, which, however, is not significant.

Figure 5-5 Simulation Results for U.S. Voter Turnout

DISCUSSION

The empirical findings presented in this study demonstrate that the structure and means of conveying political messages affect voter turnout in democratic nations around the world. Various specifications of the models used to measure the effects of political communication systems on voter turnout produced generally consistent results. First, campaign finance systems that allow more money and electoral communication in election campaigns are associated with higher levels of voter participation. Second, while public broadcasting is correlated with higher levels of voter turnout, it also modifies the effect of access to paid television advertising on voter turnout.

Still unanswered is the question of what kinds of communication systems are most conducive to a democratic citizenry. Does government intervention in the media and in campaigns promote electoral participation? The empirical results suggest that what matters most is the nature of government regulations, not governmental interference per se. This finding illuminates debates over campaign finance reform. While various values are pursued in that process such as election fairness, equality, and anticorruption, citizen participation stands high. My empirical findings clearly show that legally established ceilings on campaign contributions and expenditures depress turnout. Conversely, public financing measures, especially in the form of free television air time to parties and candidates, promote voter participation. In this regard, theoretical and policy discussions on campaign finance reform need to differentiate the modes of governmental regulations.

Chapter 6: Communication Institutions and Unequal Participation

Chapter 5 examined whether and how the cross-national turnout differences could be explained by the institutional settings surrounding the mass media and campaign communication. In this chapter, I investigate causal heterogeneities of individual-level predictors of turnout, using comparative survey data from 32 countries. The main goal of this chapter is to unravel how political communication systems moderate the associations between individual characteristics (socioeconomic status (SES) and age) and voting. In other words, I examine what kinds of communication institutional factors widen or narrow socioeconomic gaps between voters and nonvoters.

Political information environment should matter to people with low socioeconomic status more than to those with high socioeconomic status, because citizens with lower levels of education and income should find it more difficult to gather adequate political information due to lack of motivation and skills. Thus, political institutions that lower the cost of voting will particularly increase the probability of voting for lower SES citizens, which will eventually reduce the participation gap by both education and income (Highton 1997; Lijphart 1997). Thus, I expect that public broadcasting, paid political advertising, and campaign finance laws that allow more money into campaigns are expected to promote equal participation in democratic elections.

From the campaign's side, the same expectation applies as political parties or candidates use strategic calculations. Given limited time, money, and other resources, they target those likely to vote (for them) to minimize waste of resources. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) find that wealthier, more educated, and older citizens were contacted more by parties. They note: "Given their limited resources…parties must decide on whom they will target their efforts. Resources they devote to people who are unlikely to turn out or unlikely to support them are resources wasted" (1993, 163). Thus, it is expected that public funding will increase low-SES citizen participation, as the additional amount of public funding will provide more resources for parties to mobilize voters. Conversely,

campaign funding limits (including contribution and expenditure caps) are likely to increase budget constraints for parties. They will thus engage in more selective targeting. More educated, wealthier, and older voters will therefore be disproportionately contacted to vote. And campaign funding limits will again result in more unequal participation.

DATA

Data for the dependent and the individual-level independent variables are taken from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Module 2, which is a compilation of representative political surveys from electoral democracies in the early 2000s. Although the number of countries included in the CSES, Module 2, is 40, this study includes the surveys of thirty-two countries because of data availability (i.e., questions about voter participation, respondents' education, income, etc.). A total of 40,294 subjects, as a result, are included in my multilevel analysis.[60]

The response (dependent) variable is a dichotomy distinguishing between who voted (1) and who did not vote (0), based on the question, "Did you cast a ballot in the most recent election?" I include data only for legislative/parliamentary elections in order to obtain comparable results with those of Chapter 5. The individual-level explanatory variables include respondents' age, gender, education, income, contact by a party, feeling close to any political party, and political efficacy. My measures of the explanatory variables are described in Table A-4 in the Appendix. At the country level, the multilevel models test all the variables explored in Chapter 5. Table A-5 in the Appendix reports summary statistics of the individual and contextual variables respectively.

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[60] The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems offers a rare opportunity to conduct comparative behavior studies. In the case of voting, however, there is a caveat. As it is based on respondents' reports, there is a risk of overreporting. Existing studies well explain the problem of overvoting in survey data. In the U.S., there are validated voting survey data. The comparison actually shows a somewhat large difference between the actual turnout rates and aggregated percentage of those who reported voting in the CSES. Despite this limitation, the CSES is the best option available for me as it includes the largest number of countries enough to enable a multilevel modeling.

While socioeconomic status (measured by education, occupation, and income) is the most important correlate of voting (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1996; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), age is also an important predictor of voting. Conventional wisdom holds that older citizens are more likely to vote than younger ones (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Strate et al. 1989). Previous studies have found a significantly positive impact by age on political engagement and participation. According to Verba, Nie, and Kim, young people are:

> still unsettled; they are likely to be residentially and occupationally mobile. They have yet to develop the stake in the politics of a particular locality that comes with extended residence, with home ownership, with children in school, and the like….Early in life, interest and involvement in politics are lower in part because exposure to political life has not existed for long and in part because the initiation of many aspects of one's life—starting an occupation, a family—it is the dominant concern. And in later life, interest and involvement in politics fall off as a concomitant of aging" (1978, 139).

The correlation between age and political engagement is largely due to the fact that the young tend to have their priorities on life issues other than politics (Strate et al. 1989). Thus, I predict that younger voters will be more susceptible to political contexts as well as institutional settings surrounding election campaigns, due to their lack of political interest and motivation.

Contrary to the prevailing idea that women are less active in politics, previous studies find just a patchy and insignificant impact of gender on voting in the United States (e.g., Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1995; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). In fact, gender difference in political participation is mainly affected by social norms and expectations (Jennings 1983; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Jennings (1998) finds a widespread gender gap in various forms of political participation in China. According to Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) in their seven-nation study, India and Nigeria had the most serious gender inequality in overall participation. When it comes to the United States and other advanced democracies, however, there is small gap between male and female participation, when other factors were held constant. A more recent study by Schlozman, Burns, and Verba (1995) also finds no significant gender differences in voting and

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working for campaigns, even though women less participate in making a contributions, contacting government officials, or affiliating with political organizations.[61] Therefore, while I expect a cross-national gender-gap variation in voter participation, I am not certain how gender plays a role in an individual's decision to vote.

Psychological attitudes also affect political participation (Finkel 1987). In particular, political efficacy — both internal (political self-esteem) and external (feelings of system responsiveness) has a significant effect on voting and campaigning (Finkel 1985).   In addition, psychological attachment to political parties promotes voter participation. In American politics, many studies have established that strong partisans are more engaged and active participants in politics than nonpartisans (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). In a comparative study, Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) find that party identifiers are more likely to vote than the unaffiliated.

Previous studies argue that the decrease in levels of political efficacy and party loyalty is in part responsible for the decline of voter turnout in the United States and other countries, while socioeconomic variables (including the level of education and income as well as institutional conditions) have become more favorable to turnout or constant in the given period.   Shaffer (1981) finds that the decline of turnout during 1960 and 1976 was due to the decrease of partisanship and political efficacy. Abramson and Aldrich (1982) estimated approximately 70% of the turnout decline during 1960-1980 was attributable to the decline in external efficacy and partisanship.[62] Drawing on existing studies, my model predicts that people with higher levels of political efficacy and those who feel close to any political party are more likely to go to the polls.

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[61] Schlozman, Burns, and Verba (1999) suggest that women are disadvantaged in political participation because of inequality in workplace experiences.

[62] Note, however, that Finkel (1987) applied his political efficacy model in West Germany, where he found that internal efficacy did not have a significant impact on turnout or campaigning activity, in contrast with the U.S. case.

METHOD

My empirical analysis relies on cross-national analyses with two data levels of hierarchical structure. Institutional data, gross economic indicators, and political communication systems are collected at national levels, with individual-level information on demographics and political attitudes. Thus, individuals and countries are units, with the former nested within the latter. If this data structure is not handled adequately, it might cause "aggregation bias, misestimated precision, and the unit of analysis problem" (Raudernbushand and Bryk 2002, 5). Specifically, if the model is estimated with OLS, the error terms violate assumptions because the random errors are neither independent nor homoskedastic (Raudernbushand and Bryk 2002, 21). When using cross-national survey data, the information might have heterogeneous data-collection design used within each unit, while conventional OLS assumes equal variances across units on the dependent variable. If the variation in sampling precision across units is not considered, there will be inefficient parameter estimation. Multilevel models will enable the estimation of (1) relationships at individual and country levels simultaneously and (2) standard errors by dividing the unexplained variance into two components – country level (random effects of countries) and individual level.[63]

More importantly, there is substantive motivation to employ hierarchical modeling.[64] Multilevel modeling enables a researcher to specify "causal heterogeneity," or cross-level interactions (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). As my main aim is to investigate cross-level relationships and determine whether the effects of respondents'

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[63] That is $Y_{ij} = \alpha + X\beta + u_j + e_{ij}$, where u_j is the residual in group j, and e_{ij} is the residual for individual i within the group.

[64] Raudernbushand and Bryk (2002, 100) explain:
  Heterogeneity of regression occurs when the relationships between individual characteristics and outcomes vary across organization. Although this phenomenon has often been viewed as a methodological nuisance, the causes of heterogeneity of regression are often of substantive interest. Hierarchical linear models enable the investigator to estimate a separate set of regression coefficients for each organizational unit, and then to model variation among the organizations in their sets of coefficients as multivariate outcomes to be explained by organizational factors.

socioeconomic status are conditioned by political communication systems, the use of multilevel modeling is required. In particular, the intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes model might be best suited to answer the question of whether some types of political communication institutions make more equitable social distributions of voters and why some countries have greater SES effects than others.[65] For each country, I obtain the coefficients of the logistic regression, allowing for random variability in both intercept and slopes. I expect that the socioeconomic differentials in the propensity to vote (e.g., the SES and age coefficients) should vary as a function of political communication systems, as well as of political institutions and socioeconomic development.

MODELS

Three different specifications of multilevel models are used to estimate the determinants of an individual's voting: (1) a random-intercept model, (2) a means-as-outcome model, and (3) a cross-level interaction model (i.e., intercepts and slopes as outcome model).[66]

In a random-intercept model, only the intercept is allowed to vary across countries. While the model assumes that the mean level of voting across countries varies, the effects of individual-level predictors are fixed across the sample, holding those slope values constant across all countries.

The second model allows prediction of variation in voter participation levels (mean voting) by country-level variables as well as individual-level covariates. Unlike the random-intercept model, a means-as-outcome model sets the individual-level variables as random effects, with the assumption that the effects of individual-level factors vary across countries.

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[65] In other words, the model parameter variance in the level-1 coefficients is explained by level-2 parameters.

[66] All the individual-level predictors are centered on their grand means, so that the intercept estimates will be calculated precisely. So the intercept will represent the group-mean value for a person with a (grand) average on every predictor, while the

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The final model tries to explain the heterogeneity of the effect of individual-level variables across countries. In other words, it tests whether such cross-national variation in the effect of the individual-level predictors can be attributed to the types of country-level characteristics of political institutions, socioeconomic development, and political communication systems.

PRE-TESTS

      Before estimating multilevel models, I conducted unconditional (or null) models to examine whether employing hierarchical modeling is necessary. If I witness significant variation in voting at the national level or significant within-cluster interdependence, then multilevel modeling is necessary because ignoring the multilevel character of the data would produce adverse consequences.

      The main conclusion after examining this output is that there is a significant amount of country-level variation in voting. Table 6-1 reports estimates of the ANOVA model. The logit estimate of the grand mean (intercept) is 1.73 and the variance component is 0.60. The statistically significant variance component suggests that there is considerable variance in voting at the country level. On the other hand, the reliability estimate of the intercept is 0.99, which indicates that estimated differences across countries are reliable indicators of real differences among population means of the countries.

      In addition, I estimated the intraclass correlation coefficient, which represents the proportion of variance explained by the grouping structure in the population (i.e., countries).[67] The logistic distribution for the level-one residual is a variance of $\sigma^2_R = \pi^2/3$

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interpretation of slopes does not change (see Raudernbushand and Bryk (2002) regarding the issue of centering).

[67] When an outcome variable is continuous, the intraclass coefficient (ICC) – the proportion of variance attributable to between group differences – could be easily used to determine if hierarchical modeling is necessary. When the outcome variable is binary, however, the standard ICC measure cannot be used because of the characteristics of the level-1 residual term. While various methods to measure within-group interdependence

=3.29, while an intercept variance for the level-two is τ_0^2=0.032 (see Table 6-1). The formal definition of intraclass correlation is:

$$\rho_I = \frac{\tau_0^2}{\tau_0^2 + \pi^2/3}$$.

Thus, I could gain the intraclass correlation as 0.60/(0.60+3.29)=0.154 (see Snijder and Bosker 1999, 224).   Conversely, the ratio of the individual-level variance is 0.845. As the data were measured at the individual level, a large proportion of the variance in voting therefore comes at the individual level (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 231). The overall evidence, however, indicates significant variation among countries in voting, and thus a multilevel character of voter participation.

Table 6-1 Estimate of Logistic ANOVA Model

Fixed effect	Coefficient	SE	
Intercept	1.73	0.13	
Random effect	**Variance component**	**Chi-squares**	***p*-value**
Level-two variance	0.60	3273.86	0.0000

CAUSAL HETEROGENEITY IN INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PREDICTORS

Table 6-2 shows cross-national differences in the causal relationships between the individual-level predictors and the dependent variable. Note that, while the regression equation includes respondents' age, gender, education, income, political efficacy, party closeness, and contact by a political party, Table 6-2 summarizes only the logit coefficients for age, gender, education, and income. A glance at the results may easily show that the estimated coefficients of these variables have substantial variation across countries. As for the socioeconomic variables, both education and income are significant factors to explain individuals' propensity to vote in 18 and 19 countries respectively,

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have been suggested, Pearson correlation is found to be the most reliable (see Ridout, Demetrio, and Firth 1999 for further details).

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Table 6-2 Logit Regression Coefficients for Individual Countries

	% voted	Turnout	Age	Female	Education	Income	*N*
All	83%	67%	**0.024**	0.1	**0.11**	**0.094**	41478
Australia	98	84	0.015	**1.414**	-0.133	0.283	1330
Brazil	88	80	**-0.011**	-0.121	**0.128**	0.021	1754
Bulgaria	79	72	**0.016**	0.042	-0.01	-0.033	982
Canada	91	56	0.029	-0.105	0.152	0.163	1318
Chile	96	73	**0.03**	0.107	-0.128	0.219	917
Taiwan	87	75	**0.06**	*0.205*	0.019	*0.083*	2364
Czech	74	59	0.007	-0.29	0.028	**0.200**	633
Denmark	95	84	**0.043**	0.393	0.102	**0.329**	1689
Finland	81	66	**0.031**	*0.292*	**0.214**	**0.214**	1039
France	79	53	**0.027**	*0.29*	**0.131**	0.089	904
Germany	94	72	**0.019**	-0.123	**0.238**	**0.181**	1768
Hungary	83	75	**0.027**	-0.151	**0.442**	0.015	714
Ireland	86	63	**0.027**	0.126	**0.396**	**0.243**	925
Israel	89	75	**0.021**	-0.024	0.001	0.032	1783
Italy	81	86	**0.047**	-0.054	**0.271**	0.035	598
Japan	86	59	0.002	-0.401	*0.207*	0.049	509
Korea	79	58	**0.06**	-0.098	**0.297**	**0.254**	1044
Mexico	72	40	**0.024**	-0.12	0.043	*0.097*	1396
Netherlands	97	76	0.002	0.169	-0.057	**0.413**	1350
New Zealand	84	73	**0.032**	*-0.336*	**0.207**	-0.083	1043
Norway	83	75	**0.031**	0.133	**0.119**	**0.239**	1810
Peru	95	86	**0.036**	-0.068	**0.285**	-0.067	1651
Philippines	86	74	0.01	-0.036	-0.045	-0.042	991
Poland	58	48	**0.031**	-0.02	**0.156**	*0.092*	1063
Portugal	78	70	**0.046**	0.039	**0.185**	**0.194**	2463
Romania	80	60	*0.016*	**-0.506**	**0.271**	**-0.325**	505
Russia	79	65	**0.029**	**0.54**	0.085	*0.122*	898
Slovenia	77	64	**0.028**	-0.062	-0.045	**0.243**	407
Spain	89	79	0.007	0.39	0.012	0.31	628
Sweden	88	77	**0.019**	0.187	**0.15**	**0.21**	979
Switzerland	74	36	**0.038**	**-0.433**	**0.141**	**0.166**	1197
U.K.	72	59	**0.059**	0.062	**0.188**	**0.203**	737
U.S.A.	79	44	**0.023**	**0.39**	**0.336**	**0.257**	923

Note: Bold numbers indicate significant coefficients at *p*<0.05.

while not in other counties. Moreover, the magnitudes of their impacts on voting indicate large differences across countries. Notably, age seems to be consistently a significant factor to explain an individual's probability of voting except for Czech Republic, Philippines, Japan, Spain, Canada, Australia, and Netherlands. By contrast, gender affects voting in only eight countries. Furthermore, its effect is inconsistent across countries. Women are less likely to vote in Romania and Switzerland, while more likely in five other countries (Australia, Finland, France, Russia, Taiwan, and the United States).

In summary, the heterogeneity in the coefficients of individual-level explanatory variables offers evidence that the data require estimation methods incorporating such variations across countries, as well as the causal heterogeneity of individual-level factors.

MULTILEVEL MODEL RESULTS

Table 6-3 reports results for different specifications of the multilevel turnout models. Model 1 includes only the individual-level factors as explanatory variables, while no random effect has been estimated. Note that these results are just the same as logit regression analysis of the combined survey samples. The estimated results reaffirm what the previous literature has found. Higher socioeconomic status, measured by education and income, is positively associated with voting. Age also has a positive effect on voting. Political efficacy and feeling close to any political party also have positive impacts. Lastly, those who were contacted by any political party show a higher propensity to vote than those who were not contacted. Gender did not play a significant role in making voting decisions, however.

Model 2, including country-level characteristics, allows for the intercept parameters in the level-1 models (i.e., the means of the dependent variable) to vary at level-2. This random-intercept model estimates how the level-2 independent variables affect cross-national differences in turnout, measured by survey respondents' self-reported voting in the survey.   Overall, the findings substantively parallel the country-level regression results in Chapter 5. This reaffirmation is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, the size of variance in the dependent variable might be significantly

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limited in the survey data, because the CSES includes only about half the number of countries investigated in Chapter 5. Another factor that might reduce the magnitude of the variance in the dependent variable is that voters tend to overreport their voting (Abramson and Claggett 1986, 1991; Bernstein, Chadha, and Monjoy 2001; Silver, Anderson, and Abramson. 1986; Shaw, de la Garza, Lee 2000). Despite these considerations, the multilevel estimation in Model 2 has produced results comparable to those in Chapter 5, even after controlling for individual-level variables.

First of all, compulsory voting and the unicameral system have positive effects on voting. In addition, higher degrees of democracy, socioeconomic development, and district magnitudes are all associated with a higher propensity to vote. As for political communication systems, I tested all the communication variables included in the turnout models presented in Chapter 5. Two of those variables—partisan press and direct public funding—are dropped from the multilevel analysis, because these two did not indicate statistically significant effects on voter turnout in any turnout models. Public-broadcasting audience share and access to paid advertising are positively associated with a higher tendency to vote. This multilevel model, however, does not suggest an interaction effect between broadcasting systems and access to paid advertising. Each exerts an independently positive impact on voter propensity without showing a significant interaction effect. On the other hand, free television time, as expected, increases levels of voting while campaign-funding limits depress them. What was unexpected, however, is a negative effect of newspaper subscription, but it is not statistically significant and its effect is minuscule.

The means-as-outcome model (Model 2) assumes that only the intercept parameters (i.e., means) vary, but not the slopes. Yet this assumption is apparently problematic. My theory suggests that the effects of socioeconomic status and age vary as a function of different institutional settings. Institutions that lower information costs for voters will increase the probability of voting by people with low socioeconomic status.

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Table 6-3 Hierarchical Nonlinear Models of Voting

	Model 1 Microlevel only	Model 2 Intercept-as-outcome	Model 3 Interaction model
Intercept	1.96*** (0.14)	0.14 ***(0.02)	-2.22 (2.31)
Individual-Level			
Age	0.03***(0.00)	0.03***(0.003)	-0.07** (0.03)
Partisan press			-0.01 ***(0.004)
Funding limits			0.01***(0.004)
Public direct funding			- 0.02 ***(0.004)
Public broadcasting			0.0002***(0.00)
Newspaper readership			0.00***(0.00)
SOEs			0.0001 (0.0001)
HDI			0.0009**(0.00)
Female	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Education	0.11***(0.02)	0.12***(0.02)	0.27***(0.07)
Compulsory Voting			- 0.15**(0.05)
Public broadcasting			-0.001*(0.0006)
SOEs			0.00 (0.001)
Paid TV ads			-0.06* (0.03)
Free TV Time			-0.08* (0.04)
Income	0.14***(0.02)	0.14***(0.02)	-0.74** (0.26)
HDI			0.01***(0.002)
Party contact	0.40***(0.09)	0.45***(0.07)	0.45***(0.07)
Efficacy	0.21***(0.02)	0.22***(0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
Close to a party	0.89***(0.10)	0.93***(0.1)	0.94***(0.10)
Country-level intercept effects			
Public broadcasting		0.01**(0.003)	0.008 (0.005)
Paid TV ads		0.43**(0.17)	0.53**(0.23)
Funding limits		- 0.39 (0.24)	- 0.42 (0.27)
Free TV time		0.70*** (0.19)	0.87***(0.32)
Newspaper		- 0.00 (0.00)	- 0.001 (0.001)
Compulsory voting		0.07***(0.34)	1.24**(0.46)
Unicameralism		0.58***(0.19)	0.66***(0.19)
Polity		0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.12)
SOEs		- 0.006 (0.008)	- 0.009 (0.01)
District magnitude		0.008***(0.001)	0.008***(0.001)
HDI		0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)

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Variance Components (Remaining between-country variance)

Intercept	0.67	0.442	0.41
Age		0.0002	0.00009
Female		0.05	0.046
Education		0.01	0.0088
Income		0.01	0.0065
Party contact		0.08	0.091
Efficacy		0.016	0.016
Closeness to any party		0.23	0.24

My data also indicate the possibility of causal heterogeneity. First, the logit coefficients for the individual-level predictors show significant cross-country variation (Table 6-2). Second, the chi-square tests for the variance components of all the individual-level predictors in Model 2 are statistically significant.   Thus, I estimate a cross-level interaction model (Model 3) to examine whether and how political institution and communication system factors condition the effects of education, income, gender, and age on voting.

The last column in Table 6-3 contains estimated results for the cross-level interaction model. Education and household income, along with age and gender, were tested for cross-level interaction effects with country-level variables. The effects of education, income, and age are found to be moderated by various country-level factors. Gender, however, is found irrelevant in explaining voter participation and its effect is not conditioned by any country-level factors.

For education, I find that compulsory voting, broadcasting system, access to paid television advertising, and free TV time access are significant modifying factors.[68] Figure 6-1 illustrates how these four factors moderate the effect of education on individual probability of voting. Compulsory voting, as suggested by Lijphart (1997), reduces the effect of education on voting, thus flattening out its slope. Similarly, public

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Figure 6-1 Cross-level Interaction: Education

1) Compulsory voting

3) Access to paid advertising

2) Public broadcasting

4) Free TV time

broadcasting, access to paid advertising, and free TV time access moderate the effect of education on voting significantly. Among the three different levels of public-broadcasting audience share, the education gap in voting is most prominent in the countries with pure private-broadcasting systems (i.e., public audience share equals 0%), while it is least visible in those with pure public systems (i.e., public audience share equals 100%). Such

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[68] As explained in Chapter 5, I include a measure of socially owned enterprises in the models to control for the possibility that public broadcasting systems might represent overall levels of government involvement in the economy.

a disparate pattern indicates that public broadcasting disproportionately increases the probability of voting for people with low levels of education. By providing a larger quantity of political information, public broadcasting subsidizes information costs for low-educated citizens. This finding is also consistent with television consumption patterns of the public by education level. As shown in Table A-6 in the Appendix, level of education and television watching time are negatively correlated. The less educated spend more time watching television in a week than the higher educated. If people with less education watch television longer than their higher-educated counterparts, then the type of broadcasting system should have more effect on the former. Thus, a public broadcasting system promotes voter participation of the less educated more than the higher educated. Both access to paid advertising and free TV time indicate similar effects. While these two variables promote voting, their effects are particularly more evident for less-educated citizens.

Turning to Figure 6-2, a different measure of socioeconomic status (household income) is not conditioned by any political institution or political communication attribute. Rather, the level of a country's socioeconomic development (HDI) has a significant cross-level interaction effect with income. More-developed countries indicate a larger effect of individual household income on the propensity of voting than less-developed countries. This finding suggests that, as a country becomes more advanced, voting inequality is more apparent across income quintiles.

Figure 6-2 Cross-level Interaction: Income

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
By comparison, many institutional factors condition the causal relationship between respondents' age and voting (see Figure 6-3). Public direct funding moderates the effect of age on voting. There is a positive association between respondents' age and voting. However, the effect of age gets significantly less strong for citizens in countries providing public direct subsidies for electioneering. Conversely, campaign funding limits widen the age gap between voters and nonvoters. In countries that implement legal caps on campaign contributions and/or expenditures, the positive effect of respondents' age on voting appears clearer: Younger people have a significantly lower propensity to vote than older people. Where campaign funding limits do not exist, the slope for age becomes significantly flatter. In summary, restrictive campaign finance laws have a more negative impact on young voters' probability of voting than older voters. As discussed earlier, legal limits on campaign funding and the lack of public funding seem to encourage candidates and/or political parties to focus their mobilization efforts on "likely voters"—in this case, older citizens. As a result, generation gap widens in those countries. Media system characteristics also modify the effect of age on voting. A partisan press system, although failing to explain cross-national differences in turnout levels, is found to be effective in mobilizing young voters more than an objective press system. On the other hand, higher levels of public-broadcasting audience share are associated with a stronger effect of age on voting. This finding is apparently unexpected. Yet, when considering television consumption time by age, the role of broadcasting system may well have a disproportionately stronger effect on older citizens. Table A-6 demonstrates that older people spend a significantly longer time on television watching than younger people in all of the 22 countries investigated in the 2006 Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy (CID) Survey. Given a larger amount of exposure to television, older citizens are more susceptive to the type of a country's broadcasting system. Thus, public broadcasting systems result in a larger generation gap in voting.[69]

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[69] I conducted pilot analyses about the effects of political communication systems on other forms of political participation, such as working for campaigns, writing to politicians, persuading others, aligning with others for political concerns, and joining in protests, using the CID survey. I found that types of political communication systems

Figure 6-3 Cross-level Interaction: Age

1) Public direct funding

3) Campaign funding limits

2) Partisan press

4) Public broadcasting

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
generally fail to explain cross-national differences in the levels of these political activities, as well as individual heterogeneity. Interestingly, however, while access to paid TV advertising usually increases individual propensity to participate in various forms of political participation, public broadcasting and public direct funding, respectively, have a negative impact on such high-cost activities. When it comes to cross-level interaction effects, the results do not appear consistent or significant. Compared to the turnout model, political communication systems are less likely to condition the effect of individual-level characteristics on political participation. Such findings may suggest that political activities requiring relatively higher levels of resources and motivation are less likely to be affected by system-level characteristics, including political communication attributes, than by individual-level characteristics such as education, income, age, and gender.

PARTY CONTACT

While Model 3 in Table 6-3 has specified cross-level interaction effects between country-level factors and education, income, and age, Model 4 in Table 6-4 explores how the effect of party contact (i.e., whether or not the respondent was contacted by any party during election campaigns) is conditioned by a country's institutional factors. It has been already shown that the respondents who had been contacted by any of political parties were likely to vote more than those who had not been contacted in Table 6-3. However, the results of Model 4 show that the effect of party contact varies across countries depending on political institutions and political communication systems. First of all, compulsory voting makes the effect of party contact meaningless. There is no significant difference in individuals' propensity to vote by party contact. When voting is mandated by law, whether or not a person was contacted by any political party does not affect that individual's chances of voting. Secondly, in public broadcasting systems, party contact does not have a significant effect on voting. To the contrary, party contact has a significant impact on voting in private broadcasting systems. Similarly, free access to television airtime for political parties and/or candidates mitigates the mobilizing effect of party contact. The negative interaction effects between party contact and public broadcasting, as well as free TV access, suggest that party mobilization efforts in the form of party contact have a smaller effect in a rich information environment. In other words, the marginal effect of additional information or motivation provided by a political party is smaller in the countries that have a larger cost of nonvoting (i.e., compulsory voting) or a greater volume of campaign information (i.e., free access to TV airtime for parties/candidates and public broadcasting system).

Table 6-4 Hierarchical Nonlinear Model: Party Contact Interaction Effects

	Model 4
	Interaction model
Intercept	-2.31 (2.31)
Individual-level	
Education	0.29***(0.07)
Compulsory Voting	- 0.17**** (0.06)
Public broadcasting	-0.002**(0.0006)
SOEs	0.00 (0.00)
Paid TV ads	-0.05* (0.03)
Income	-0.74** (0.26)
HDI	0.01***(0.003)
Age	-0.07** (0.03)
Newspaper	0.00004***(0.00)
Partisan press	-0.01 ***(0.003)
Funding limits	0.02***(0.004)
Public direct funding	- 0.02 ***(0.004)
Public broadcasting	0.0003***(0.00)
HDI	0.001**(0.00)
SOEs	0.00 (0.00)
Party contact	0.91***(0.23)
Compulsory	-0.34* (0.21)
Public broadcasting	-0.004* (0.002)
SOEs	0.00 (0.00)
Free TV Time	-0.33**(0.16)
Female	0.04 (0.05)
Close to a party	0.94***(0.10)
Efficacy	0.24*** (0.03)
Country-level intercept effects	
Public broadcasting	0.008*(0.005)
Paid TV ads	0.51**(0.23)
Funding limits	- 0.42 (0.26)
Free TV time	0.91***(0.31)
Newspaper	- 0.001 (0.001)
Compulsory voting	1.31***(0.46)
Unicameralism	0.73***(0.23)
Polity	0.15 (0.12)

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SOE	- 0.007 (0.01)
District magnitude	0.008***(0.003)
HDI	0.02 (0.03)

Variance Components (Remaining between-country variance)	
Intercept	0.405
Education	0.009
Income	0.007
Age	0.00009
Contacted	0.052
Close to party	0.24
Female	0.05
Efficacy	0.016

DISCUSSION

The empirical findings in the multilevel models illustrate that different configurations of political communication institutions have heterogeneous effects on citizens with different socioeconomic, demographic, and political backgrounds. First of all, political communication institutions that lower information costs for voters – public broadcasting, free TV time, and access to paid advertising – promote equal participation in terms of education levels. While unequal participation has been a long-standing concern for scholars and policy makers, the empirical results in this chapter suggest that the effect of formal education can be significantly mitigated by the political information environment. A rich information climate promotes voting, particularly, of those with lower formal education. Second, various aspects of political communication systems can also affect the role of age in voting. Campaign finance systems that restrict monetary contributions and/or expenditures, or that fail to provide public funding, increase the age gap among voters and nonvoters. Among media system variables, nonpartisan press and public broadcasting systems also strengthen the relationship between age and voting. Third, while party contact during election campaigns significantly increases individual probability of voting, its effect is especially moderated by a country's broadcasting system and free TV time for political parties. In countries with strong public broadcasting

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systems or free access to TV time, contact by political parties does not make any difference in decisions to go to the polls.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The thrust and quality of a democracy depends on its citizens' active involvement and participation in politics. Accordingly, scholars and policymakers have been well aware that a politically active and enlightened citizenry relies heavily on sound political communication. Previous studies, however, rarely explore the relationship between institutional settings of political communication and citizen political behavior. My dissertation aimed to fill the gap in existing studies and estimate the effects of different political communication institutions on voter participation.

I examined political communication systems as a critical institution for governing a democracy, with the goal of evaluating performance within various formats. The crux of my research design was the international comparison of political communication systems. Using descriptive and statistical analyses, my research design included country-specific institutional data, multicountry survey data, and analysis of legal regulations. The core findings have confirmed my expectation that both cross-national turnout differences and socioeconomic bias in elections are affected by political communication institutions in a country.

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In chapter 4, I illustrated how countries structure and regulate their political communication institutions of media systems, paid television advertising, and campaign finance laws. As many scholars have noted, broadcasting systems have become substantially commercialized. The average private broadcasting audience share accounted for 60 percent. At the same time, a large majority guaranteed the use of political commercials on television for electoral communication. On the other hand, 60 percent of the countries have partisan press systems. The news content of major newspapers indicates either a clear partisan bias or the fact that press organizations are affiliated or owned by the government, political parties, or major social groups. When it comes to government regulations on campaign finance, almost all countries in my data institute

legal regulations on money in politics. In particular, public finance has become a popular policy option to fund political parties and/or candidates.

Chapter 5 explored how institutional settings regulating the media and campaigns impinge on cross-national turnout differences. Assuming that political participation is affected by its underlying costs and benefits, I hypothesized that political communication systems lowering information costs for voters have higher turnout levels. The empirical analysis investigated the effect of political communication systems on cross-national turnout differences in legislative elections between 1995 and 2004. The key explanatory variables were measured by media systems, access to paid TV advertising, and campaign finance laws. The major findings are two-fold. First, governmental regulations on campaign finance affect voter turnout.   When campaign finance laws are geared toward extending campaign resources and the electioneering activities of political parties and candidates, they promote voter participation. In particular, campaign contribution and expenditure limits depress turnout, yet free television time for political parties and candidates increases it. Public direct funding, on the other hand, has a significant effect only in the subsample analysis of advanced democracies. Second, public broadcasting promotes voter turnout. At the same time, the type of broadcasting system modifies the effect of paid television advertising. Access to paid TV advertising has a positive impact on turnout in public broadcasting systems, while it has a negative effect in predominantly private systems.

Lastly, Chapter 6 investigated if and how certain types of political communication systems change the effect of individual-level factors—socioeconomic status and age—on voting and thus produce more equal participation. The hierarchical modeling estimates show that institutional factors expected to create an information-rich environment for voters reduce the education gap between voters and nonvoters. Public broadcasting systems, access to paid television advertising, and free TV time for political parties and candidates, respectively, are found to mitigate the effect of individual formal education on voting. In addition, the effect of age is modified by different systems of political communication. Public direct funding and a partisan press narrow the generation gap by

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encouraging younger voters' electoral participation. In contrast, campaign contribution and expenditure limits are found to enhance the effect of age. Public broadcasting systems are also found to strengthen the role of age in voter participation, due mainly to the fact that older citizens tend to spend significantly more time watching television than do younger counterparts. In another multilevel model, I also investigated whether the effect of party contact is conditioned by different types of political communication systems. The findings show that the mobilizing effect of party contact is less prominent in countries with higher levels of public-broadcasting audience share and free TV-time access. In other words, party contact has a stronger impact on an individual's propensity to vote in the countries where information costs are relatively high.

CONTRIBUTIONS

My dissertation is the first empirical study to evaluate the effects of institutional differences in political communication on mass political behavior from a comparative perspective. I illuminate political communication systems as core institutions that affect individual costs of voting and eventually the propensity to vote. Although many studies have acknowledged the critical role of political institutions and electoral systems in elections, few have explored how institutions regulating political communication affect voter turnout. Given that citizens need adequate levels of information to participate in politics, this absence is clearly problematic.

Since the 1980s, communication scholars have become more active in studying campaign communication from a comparative perspective (e.g., Butler and Ranney 1981, 1992; Norris 2002; Swanson and Mancini 1996; Siune 1987). Still, many examinations are more schematic than empirical (e.g., Norris 2000), and others are mainly case studies of a single nation. While these assessments supply valuable information and frameworks, they are based on rather diffuse research themes. Content analytic studies have produced diverse works on media content in elections (e.g., McCombs, Lopez-Escobar, and Llamas 2000; McGregor, Fountaine, and Comrie 2000). Yet most of them are also descriptive and single-case studies (cf., Semetko et al. 1991). They focus on messages rather than on message sources or message receivers. Causal relationships are not of interest for most

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content analytic studies. Compared to previous studies, this dissertation is a theory-driven, comparative, and empirical study of the relations between citizenship, politics, and communication.

Next, the compilation of an original dataset is another contribution of this dissertation. For my empirical analysis, I have documented a dataset of political communication systems in seventy-four countries. This dataset covers a wide scope of variables measuring political communication systems, which no previous study has integrated within a single study. Furthermore, the data include a large set of diverse countries, in terms of geography and levels of socioeconomic and political development.

Finally, this research offers useful implications for designing communication policies and electoral rules. The increasing development and diffusion of new communication technologies, along with the influx of commercial influences on broadcasting systems and electoral campaigning, have become worldwide phenomena. Many nations are trying to cope with these simultaneous threats and opportunities by issuing national communication policies. Thus, my efforts to measure the effects of political communication systems in different nations will contribute to policymaking processes in different countries.

My empirical findings suggest that what matters is the nature of a government's regulations, not governmental interference per se. The demobilizing effects of legally set ceilings on campaign contributions and expenditures, along with bans on paid TV advertising in public broadcasting systems, indicate that governmental intervention in electioneering processes can be undesirable. Conversely, the positive effects of public broadcasting systems and public financing, especially in the form of free TV time to parties and candidates, tell an opposite story. In this regard, the competing theoretical discussion between the liberal model and the public model may need to consider qualitative differences in the modes of governmental intervention in political communications.

On the other hand, the empirical findings offer indirect but strong evidence of media and campaign mobilization effects. Political communication systems that permit

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more electioneering communication, and thus lower information costs, promote voter participation. Yet the negative effect of private broadcasting systems indicates that the free-market approach to media regulations does not create an ideal setting for the "marketplace of ideas" in fostering an engaged and participatory citizenry. In this regard, media commercialization may be a double-edged sword. Government regulations that facilitate campaign communication are found to be conducive to ideal democratic citizens. Yet a predominantly commercial broadcasting system undermines citizen participation. In this sense, Entman (1989) and Harbermas (1989) give useful insights for rethinking the logic behind the marketplace of ideas and a free market.

FUTURE RESEARCH

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation is the first venture attempting to unravel the effect of structures of political communication institutions on mass political behavior, using large-N statistical analyses. This study is not free of limitations, though. One of the most prominent shortfalls might be that the political-communication-system variables used in the empirical tests do not encompass all cross-national differences in political communication systems, which are "much more subtly nuanced and conditioned on a number of characteristics of individual countries" (Gunther and Mughan 2000, 402). One hopes that future studies can address this issue and offer a more accurate picture of contemporary political communication systems and their effects on democratic citizenries.

Another suggestion for future research is to provide a clearer specification of mechanisms to explain how different measures of political communication systems affect individual voting probability. Because the political-communication-system variables are aggregate level, while the dependent variable (voting) is microlevel, they create an intrinsic analysis problem. By employing multilevel modeling, my dissertation addressed this concern. Still, causal relationships between some communication institution variables and voting await a clearer specification of causality. In particular, one might ask how public direct subsidies affect the amount of money in campaigns and electoral

competitiveness, because previous studies do not agree on their effects (e.g., Donnay and Ramsden 1995; Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose 2006).

Finally, the development of new media—such as the Internet, Twitter, and smart-phone technology—provides both another challenge and an opportunity for future research. How will the Internet affect citizen political engagement and participation? Compared to television, the Internet enables more direct interactions between candidates and electorates, as well as between citizens themselves.[70] How new technological developments will shape future information environments remains an open question.

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[70] For example, social networking sites like Facebook, Youtube, and political blogs were actively used for fundraising and mobilization, in recent U.S. elections.

APPENDIX

TABLE A-1 TURNOUT AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

	Turnout	Election Year	Broadcasting system	Public audience share	TV ads	Funding limits	Public direct funding	Free TV access	Partisan press
Albania	81.25	1996, 1997	Mixed	n/a	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Argentina	79.1	1995, 1998, 1999	Private	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Armenia	48.05	1995, 1999	Mixed	53	No	Yes	No	Yes	High
Australia	82.4	1996, 1998, 2001	Private	17	Yes	No	Yes	Yes[2]	Low
Austria	75.6	1995, 1999	Mixed	78	Yes	No	Yes	Yes[3]	High
Belgium	85.13	1995, 1999, 2003	Mixed	41	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Bolivia	64.8	1997, 2002	Private	n/a	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Brazil	81.65	1998, 2002	Private	11	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Bulgaria	69.5	1997, 2001	State/public	75	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	High
Canada	55.85	1997, 2000	Mixed	34	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Chile	72.8	1997, 2001	Mixed	59	No	No	No	Yes	High
Colombia	39.25	1998, 2002	Mixed	27	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Costa Rica	72.75	1998, 2002	Private	0	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Croatia	73.3	1995, 2000, 2003	State/public	87	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Cyprus (Greek)	76.75	1996, 2001	Private	23	Yes	No	No	No	High
Czech Republic	71.23	1996, 1998, 2002	Mixed	34	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Denmark	83.55	1998, 2001	State/public	80	No[1]	No	Yes	Yes	High
Dominican Republic	53.85	1996, 1998	Private	6.2	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Ecuador	59.93	1996, 1998, 2002	Private	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	High
El Salvador	33.15	2000, 2003	Private	n/a	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Estonia	47.4	1995, 1999	Mixed	29	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Finland	68.77	1995, 1999, 2003	Mixed	48	Yes	No	Yes	No	Low
France	66.5	1997, 2002	Mixed	43	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Georgia	56.45	1995, 1999	Mixed	66	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Germany	73.9	1998, 2002	Mixed	61	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Ghana	66.3	1996, 2000	Mixed	33	No	No	No	Yes	High
Greece	86.45	1996, 2000	Private	8	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Guatemala	36.16	1995, 1999, 2003	Private	0	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Honduras	68	1997, 2001	Private	n/a	Yes	No	Yes	No	High
Hungary	62	1998, 2002	Private	20	Yes	Yes	Yes	Free	High
India	64.57	1996, 1998, 1999	State/public	88	No	Yes	No	Yes	High
Ireland	64.35	1997, 2002	Mixed	68	No	No	No[4]	Yes	Low
Israel	84.4	1996, 1999, 2001	Mixed	36	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Italy	89	1994, 1996	Mixed	61	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Jamaica	47.05	1997, 2002	Private	0	Yes	No	No	No	Low
Japan	59.6	1996, 2000, 2003	Mixed	39	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Korea	60.53	1996, 2000, 2004	State/public	77	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High

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	Turnout	Election Year	Broadcasting system	Public audience share	TV ads	Funding limits	Public direct funding	Free TV access	Partisan press
Latvia	51.5	1998, 2002	Private	17.4	Yes	No	No	Yes	Low
Lithuania	50.2	1996, 2000	Private	23	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Macedonia	48	1994, 1998	Mixed	n/a	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Malaysia	56.5	1995, 1999	Mixed	47	Yes	No	No	Yes	High
Mauritius	78.35	1995, 2000	State/public	100	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Low
Mexico	51.3	1997, 2000	Private	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Moldova	60.4	1998, 2001	Mixed	44	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	High
Mongolia	72.3	1996, 2000	State/public	n/a	No	No	Yes	Yes	High
Netherlands	74.4	1998, 2002, 2003	Mixed	57	Yes	No	No[4]	Yes	High
New Zealand	77.2	1996, 1999, 2002	Mixed	71	Yes	Yes	Yes[5]	Yes	High
Nicaragua	78.1	1996, 2001	Mixed	n/a	Yes	No	Yes	No	High
Norway	76	1997, 2001	Mixed	47	No	No	Yes	Yes	High
Panama	76.1	1999, 2004	Mixed	0	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Paraguay	53.38	1998, 2003	Mixed	0	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Peru	71.63	1995, 2000, 2001	Private	0	Yes	No	No	Yes	Low
Philippines	66.63	1995, 1998, 2001	Private	17	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	High
Poland	48.2	1997, 2001	Mixed	57	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Portugal	67.86	1995, 1999, 2002	Mixed	38	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Romania	70.2	1996, 2000	Mixed	37	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Russia	61.35	1995, 1998	State/public	96	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Slovakia	74.5	1998, 2002	Mixed	35	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Slovenia	74	1996, 2000	Mixed	55	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
South Africa	60.95	1999, 2004	State/public	100	No	No	Yes	Yes	High
Spain	77.2	1996, 2000	Mixed	43	Yes	Yes[6]	Yes	Yes	High
Sri Lanka	82.2	2000, 2004	State/public	81	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Sweden	77.7	1998, 2002	Mixed	51	No[1]	No	Yes	Yes	High
Switzerland	35.93	1995, 1999, 2003	State/public	89	No	No	No	No	High
Taiwan	72.68	1996, 1998	Mixed	60	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Thailand	69	1995, 1996, 2001	Mixed	60	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Trinidad & Tobago	68.65	1995, 2000	Mixed	n/a	Yes	No	No	No	Low
Turkey	79.5	1995, 1999, 2002	Private	0	No	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Ukraine	66.66	1998, 2002	Private	14	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	High
United Kingdom	64.07	1997, 2001	Mixed	60	No	Yes	No	Yes	High
United States	41.15	1998, 2002	Private	0	Yes	No	No	No	Low
Uruguay	94	1999, 2004	Private	3	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
Venezuela	44.6	1998, 2000	Private	3	Yes	No	No	No	High
Zambia	36	1996, 2001	State/public	100	Yes	No	No	No	High

1. Only on local channels (Austin and Tjernström 2003); 2. Public broadcasting channels provide free time to parties based on internal policies; 3. In effect, between 1967-2001 (Grant 2005); 4. Only for general party administration, not for campaign activities (Grant 2005); 5. For party and member support such as running electorate offices (Grant 2005); 6. Spending limits imposed on media time purchase (Plasser and Plasser 2002)

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TABLE A-2 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND DATA SOURCES

Variables	Description	Mean	S.D.
Voter turnout [a]	Average voter turnout rates in national legislative elections between 1995 and 2004 [Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, et.]	65.8	14.1
Level of democracy	Polity IV scores in 1999	8.15	2.25
Compulsory voting	Dummy=1 for countries with enforced mandatory voting	0.16	0.37
Unicameralism	Dummy=1 if country has unicameral system	0.53	0.51
Average district magnitude [b]	The total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the total number of district in that tier in 2000	13.4	31.1
Socioeconomic development	The Human Development Index (HDI) in 2000 [Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2000]	81.6	10.8
Socially owned enterprises	Market share of state-owned enterprises (%) [Source: Djankov et al. 2003]	29.8	12.3
State/public broadcasting system [c]	Dummy=1 if country has state monopoly or dominantly public system	0.16	0.37
Private system [c]	Dummy=1 if country has private broadcasting system	0.32	0.47
Mixed system [c]	Dummy=1 if country is not state/public nor private systems	0.51	0.50
Partisan press [d]	Dummy =1 if the press is partisan in the content and organizational affiliation	0.62	0.49
Public broadcasting audience share	Total audience share of public broadcasting channels out of aggregate audience share of the five largest television stations (Only television channels providing news content included) [Sources: Djankov et al. 2003; Eurodata/Mediametrie 2003]	44	32
Newspaper subscription	Number of daily newspaper subscribers per 1,000 people in population [Source: World Development Indicator 2000]	152	131
Campaign funding limits [e]	Dummy=1 if country institutes legal campaign contribution or/and spending limit	0.45	0.45
Public direct funding [f]	Dummy =1 if country provides direct public funding for electioneering purposes	0.72	0.46
Free TV access [g]	Dummy=1 if country offers free TV time access	0.83	0.37
Access to paid TV ads [h]	Dummy=1 if country provides access to paid television advertising to political parties and/or candidates during election campaigns	0.76	0.44

[a] For the United States, only off-year election turnout rates are included (i.e., 1998 and 2002) to avoid cross-over effects from the concurring presidential campaigns. [b] [Source: Golder (2005), retrieved from http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html]. Paraguay from Chang and Golden (2007). [c] Data are from Plasser and Plasser (2002), Semetko (1996), Djankov et al. (2003), Eurodata/Mediametrie (2003), etc. [d] Coded by author from data available from various sources: Hallin and Mancini (2004), World Press Encyclopedia: A Survey of Press Systems Worldwide (2003), Freedom of the Press 2002, CIA World Factbook 2002, Harcourt (2005), etc. [e] Grant (2005) for Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Portugal, and Slovakia. Plasser and Plasser (2002) for Greece. and Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) for all other countries. [f] Grant (2005) for the Netherlands. Plasser and Plasser (2002) for Georgia. Austin and Tjernström (2003) for Cyprus. Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) for all other countries. [g] Grant (2005) for Australia, Austria, Ireland. Election observation mission report 2003 for Estonia. Austin and Tjernström (2003) for Croatia, Jordan, Malaysia, Moldova, Portugal, Slovenia, Sri Lanka. Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) for all other countries. [h] Portugal and Denmark from Grant (2005), Plasser and Plasser (2002) for all countries except for Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, and Zambia. Data for these eight countries are from country-specific literature. Data from multiple sources are cross-validated.

TABLE A-3 CODING FOR PARTISAN PRESS

Countries	Coding	Description and Sources
Albania	High	Political parties and labor unions publish their own newspapers. Press coverage has been criticized as overly biased (WPE, p. 8).
Argentina	Low	Among the four major newspapers by circulation, La Nacion (left-wing) takes 20% of market share. Other major papers are independent and catch-all (WPE, p. 19).
Armenia	High	Newspapers are highly dependent on patronage from political parties, economic interest groups, or wealthy persons (WPE, p. 35; FH 2002).
Australia	Low	Three out of the largest four dailies are owned by News Corp reflecting conservative bias and advocating free market economy. In general, however, they are catch-all press (WPE, pp. 45-6).
Austria	High	Strong history of partisan press (Hallin and Mancini 2004)
Belgium	High	Strong history of partisan press (Hallin and Mancini 2004)
Bolivia	High	Major newspapers have ties with and are arranged by political parties (WPE, pp.106-108; worldpress.org; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Bolivia).
Brazil	High	Major newspapers are partisan— Folha de S.Paulo(liberal), O Globo (centrist), Estado de SP (conservative), although press system is becoming less partisan since the early 2000s (WPE, p. 14)
Bulgaria	High	Political parties and labor union own newspapers (WPE, 135-6).
Canada	Low	Objective press (HM, pp. 209)
Chile	High	Press reflects strong political orientation and political interests of an wide ideological spectrum (WPE, p. 178).
Colombia	High	Ideologically divided and heavily dependent on the government due to its extensive purchase of advertising (WPE, pp. 201-202)
Costa Rica	Low	Two major newspapers have slight conservative slant, but most of the major newspapers aim at catch-all press (WPE, 213).
Croatia	Low	All newspapers are owned by individuals or large corporations. Although the two major dailies show some differences in ideological stances— Vecernji List (conservative-leaning) and Jutarnji List (liberal-leaning), they are mass-circulation press (WPE, pp. 223-25).
Cyprus (Greek)	High	Daily newspapers represent ideological and partisan spectrum of the country (WPE, p. 241).
Czech Republic	Low	About 22% of the total circulation out of 4 major daily explicitly partisan – Pravo (left-wing). Others are catch-all press (WPE, pp. 243-248; FH 2000).
Denmark	High	Strong history of partisan press (Hallin and Mancini 2004)
Dominican Republic	Low	All the major dailies are independent and commercial (WPE, pp. 264-266).
Ecuador	High	Newspapers are aligned with ideology (WPE, 274; www.worldpress.org).
El Salvador	Low	Two major newspapers aim at mainstream newspapers. El Diario de Hoy had been conservative and pro-government, but it became more objective in recent years (WPE, 284).
Estonia	Low	Major newspapers are independent (FH 2002; www. Worldpress.org; http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pages/publications/zip/baltic/vil06-1.html).
Finland	Low	Catch-all press (Van Kempen 2007)
France	High	Highly partisan (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
Georgia	Low	No particular ideological perspectives (WPE, p. 349)
Germany	Low	Catch-all press (Van Kempen 2007)
Ghana	High	State-owned newspapers are strongly pro-government, while others are

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		independent (WPE, p. 371).
Greece	High	Highly partisan (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
Guatemala	High	Blurred lines between journalism and politics; influential politicians and their families own newspapers (WPE, p. 391).
Honduras	High	Influential political figures own major newspapers —very partisan (WPE, pp. 418-9).
Hungary	High	Major newspapers are partisan and there is "a tendency to present the newspapers' avowed political leanings with little or no attempt at balance in editorial view point" (WPE, p.429).
India	High	Segmented by region, language, and ethnicity (WPE, p. 441)
Ireland	Low	Catch-all press (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
Israel	High	Newspapers have "strong religious and/or political ties," financially depending on political parties, religious groups, and the government (WPE, p. 476).
Italy	High	Highly partisan (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
Jamaica	Low	Commercial and independent (WPE, pp. 498-9)
Japan	High	Newspapers explicitly represent partisan stances (WPE, pp. 500-12; worldpress.org)
Korea	High	Major newspapers indicate some ideological orientations (pro-business and conservative), but they aim at general readership (WPE, pp. 841-44)
Latvia	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan (WPE, pp. 551-6)
Lithuania	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan (WPE, pp. 573-5)
Macedonia	High	Polarized along the ethnic ties (WPE, p. 580; FH 2002)
Malaysia	High	"The political parties and their investment companies control the major newspapers in Malaysia" (WPE, p. 593).
Mauritius	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan (WPE, p. 608; worldpress.org).
Mexico	Low	Dominantly mass-circulation newspapers (WPE, pp. 611-612)
Moldova	High	Until the mid 1990s, the political parties' press dominated the market. In the early 2000's about 40 percent of the press still belongs to political parties (WPE, p.618).
Mongolia	High	Mostly independent in ideological stance, but dependent on the government for advertising revenues (WPE, p. 624).
Netherlands	High	Strong history of partisan press (HM; Van Kempen 2006)
New Zealand	High	Some major newspapers show conservative slant, but mainly aiming at catch-all press (WPE, p. 213; worldpress.org).
Nicaragua	High	Newspapers represent partisan division of the country (WPE, pp. 667-8).
Norway	High	Strong history of partisan press (HM)
Panama	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan (WPE, p. 712; FH 2002)
Paraguay	High	Print media are independently owned but closely tied to political parties, factions, and business interest (WPE, p. 724).
Peru	Low	Slight ideological tone, but not explicitly partisan (WPE, p. 728).
Philippines	High	Pro-government v. independent (WPE, pp.734-735; worldpress.org; FH 2002)
Poland	High	Explicitly partisan views and engaged in political movement(WPE, pp. 742-743)
Portugal	Low	Catch-all press (Van Kempen 2007)
Romania	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan, while local newspapers show some partisan influence (WPE, pp. 768-9).
Russia	Low	Major newspapers are independent or centrist (WPE, pp. 776-8; worldpress.org).
Slovakia	High	Major newspapers are aligned by parties and social groups (WPE, p. 827).

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Slovenia	High	Independent press, but the government owns stocks in several large newspapers (WPE, pp. 834-5)
South Africa	High	Subscription is divided by race and ideology (WPE, pp. 857-61).
Spain	High	Highly partisan (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
Sri Lanka	High	Major newspapers are owned by political parties and the state (WPE, 878).
Sweden	High	Highly partisan (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
Switzerland	High	Strong history of partisan press (HM)
Taiwan	Low	Division across pro-independent vs. pro-unification, but mostly catch-all press (worldpress.org)
Thailand	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan (WPE, pp. 942-3).
Trinidad & Tobago	Low	Major newspapers are independent and nonpartisan (WPE, pp. 952-3; worldpress.org).
Turkey	Low	Major newspapers are commercial and catch-all (WPE, 960; FH 2002).
Ukraine	High	Highly partisan; as of 2002, "approximately 75 percent of all national printed media belonged to political parties and political organizations" (WPE, p. 988).
United Kingdom	High	Highly partisan (HM; Van Kempen 2007)
United States	Low	Catch-all press (HM)
Uruguay	High	Strong affiliation with political parties, which own some newspapers (WPE 1055-6).
Venezuela	High	Major newspapers are independent and centrist (WPE, p. 1072).
Zambia	High	The government owns some major daily newspapers (WPE, pp. 1090-1091).

1. WPE: *World Press Encyclopedia: A Survey of Press Systems Worldwide*, 2nd ed. 2003. Detroit
2. FH: Freedom House Press Freedom Report
3. HM: Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. 2004. *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Van Kempen, Hetty. 2007. "Media-Party Parallelism and Its Effects: A Cross-National Comparative Study." *Political Communication* 24 (3), 303-20.

TABLE A-4 DESCRIPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

Variables	Description
Vote	Dummy=1 if the respondent cast a ballot in the previous election
Female	Dummy=1 if female
Education	Education of the respondent: 1. None 2. Incomplete primary 3. Primary completed 4. Incomplete secondary 5. Secondary completed 6. Postsecondary trade/vocational school 7. University undergraduate degree incomplete 8. University undergraduate degree completed
Household income	Household income quintile appropriate to the respondent (5-scale)
Party contact	Dummy =1 if contacted by candidate or party during campaign
Political efficacy	Q: Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Where would you place yourself?: 5-point scale: (1) It doesn't make a difference to (5) It makes a difference
Feeling close to any political party	Q. Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? 1= Yes, 0= No
Age	Age (in years) of respondent

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TABLE A-5 SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Individual-level variables

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
Age	16	101	45.47	16.56
Female	0	1	0.51	0.50
Education	1	8	5.03	1.85
Vote	0	1	0.85	0.36
Contacted by party	0	1	0.25	0.44
Efficacy	1	5	3.67	1.32
Close to a party	0	1	0.47	0.50
Work for campaigns	0	1	0.11	0.30
Persuade others	0	1	0.22	0.41
Protest	0	1	0.09	0.29
Work with others	0	1	0.17	0.38
Income	1	5	2.95	1.37

Country-level variables

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
Newspapers	23	569	211.69	128.78
Compulsory voting	0	1	0.16	0.37
Unicameralism	0	10	0.34	0.48
Polity	4.00	10.00	9.07	1.52
SOEs	9.60	56.70	25.56	12.91
Partisan press	0	1	0.59	0.50
Paid TV ads	0	1	0.59	0.50
Funding limit	0	1	0.56	0.50
Public direct funding	0	1	0.75	0.44
HDI	75.20	94.60	88.46	6.45
Public audience share	0	96	46.94	25.55
Free TV time	0	1	0.87	0.34
District magnitude	1.00	150.00	13.96	32.49

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TABLE A-6 AGE/EDUCATION AND WEEKLY TELEVISION WATCHING TIME

	TV watching Time	News watching time		Television watching time	Political news watching time
Austria			**Hungary**		
Age	0.24***	0.23***	Age	0.08***	0.23***
Education	-0.18***	0.03	Education	-0.1***	-0.08***
Belgium			**Ireland**		
Age	0.23***	0.24***	Age	0.04*	0.27***
Education	-0.30***	0.004	Education	-0.18***	-0.05**
Switzerland			**Israel**		
Age	0.19***	0.28***	Age	0.17***	0.28***
Education	-0.19***	0.04*	Education	-0.21***	-0.06***
Czech Republic			**Italy**		
Age	0.23***	0.24***	Age	0.17***	0.22***
Education	-0.19***	0.05*	Education	-0.18***	-0.06**
Germany			**Netherlands**		
Age	0.23***	0.33***	Age	0.18***	0.25***
Education	-0.19***	0.1***	Education	-0.29***	-0.02
Denmark			**Norway**		
Age	0.16***	0.35***	Age	0.13***	0.33***
Education	-0.18***	0.04	Education	-0.22***	-0.13***
Spain			**Poland**		
Age	0.18***	0.18***	Age	0.08***	0.27***
Education	-0.21***	0.01	Education	-0.12***	0.02
Finland			**Portugal**		
Age	0.19***	0.38***	Age	0.08***	0.27***
Education	-0.22***	-0.09***	Education	-0.07**	0.04
France			**Sweden**		
Age	0.18***	0.20***	Age	0.15***	0.40***
Education	-0.26***	-0.05**	Education	-0.25**	-0.09***
U.K.			**Slovenia**		
Age	0.15***	0.24***	Age	0.13***	0.26***
Education	-0.26***	-0.05**	Education	-0.06**	-0.06**
Greece			**U.S.**		
Age	0.18***	0.24***	Age	0.43***	0.17***
Education	-0.26***	-0.08***	Education	-0.02	-0.09***

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